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1.  Background  and  objectiveo  of  the  Community  and  G-24  balance  of 
paymentn  anniotance for Central and Eantern European Countries 
Following  the  political  changes  in  the  Central  and  Eastern  European 
countries  (CEEC),  the  economic  nummit  held  in  Paris  in  July  1989  gave 
impetus  to  concerted  action  in  favour  of  these  countries  and  the  EC 
Commission  wao  entruoted  with  the  task  of  coordination.  This 
initiative  wao  supported  by  twenty-four  industrial  countries  and  all 
the relevant  financial  institutionn. 
During  late  1989  and  1990  it  became  increasingly  clear  to  the 
Commission,  the  Twenty-Four  and  the  International  Financial  Community 
that  the  needs  of  the  Central  and  Eastern  European  Countries  exceeded 
the  level  of  assistance  that  was  already  being  provided  for  economic 
restructuring  and  other  specific  purposes.  For  all  these  countries, 
albeit  to  different  degrees,  the  external  payments  situation  was 
beginning  to  constitute  a  serious  constraint  on  the  process  of 
transformation.  Additional  external  financing  would  be  needed  to 
support  investment,  to  make  import  of  capital  equipment  for 
modernisation  possible  and  to  provide  for  a  minimum  level  of  domeotic 
consumption.  Substantial  nupport  would  aloe  be  required  to  raise  the 
level  of  international  reserves  of  those  countries  that  were  committed 
to unifying  exchange  markets  and  make  their currencies  convertible  for 
current account  transactions at an early stage of  the  reform process. 
In  addition  to  the  needo  directly  linked  to  the  tranoition  efforts, 
evidence mounted  during  1990 that the external environment  in which  the 
CEEC  were  expected  to  implement  their reform  programmes  wao  undergoing 
a  dramatic  alteration  with  the  demise  of  the  intra-CHEA  trade  and 
settlements  system  and  the  conoequenceo  of the Gulf  crisio. 
Againot  this  background,  analyoes  produced  by  the  Commission  oervices 
for the G-24  during the  oecond half of  1990  pointed  to the prospects of 
exceptionally  large  financing  needo  in  1991.  Even  allowing  for  a 
substantial  degree  of  adjuotment  and  full  recourse  to  the multilateral 
financial  institutions  it  was  clear  that  there  was  a  risk  of 
oignificant  residual  financing  gaps,  which,  if  left  uncovered,  would 
need  to  be  cloned  either  through  the  accumulation  of  arrearo,  or 
through  intensified  adjuotment  and  additional  import  compression.  A 
further  option  might  have  been  to  delay  those  reforms  that  would  be 
likely  to  have  an  adverse  impact  on  the  balance  of  payments  in  the 
short  run,  notably  trade  liberalisation  and  currency  convertibility. 
Any  of  these  solutions  were  regarded  as  undesirable  since  they  would 
compromise  the  success  of  the  reform  effort  and  delay  the  integration 
of these economies  into the world  economy. 
From  the  outset,  the  Community  and  the  G-24  governments  adopted  the 
position  that  the  multilateral  financial  institutions,  and  especially 
the  IHF  and  the  World  Bank,  should  play  the  central  role  in  providing 
financial  assistance  for  the  countrieo  of  Central  and  Eastern  Europe, 
in  the  context  of  comprehenaive  adjustment  and  reform  programmes. 
However,  since  these  institutions  could  not  cover  alone  the  entire 
financing  requirements,  and  since  there  were  indications  that 
commercial  banks  and  other private  investors  were  reluctant  to  provide - 2  -
substantial  amounts  of  financing  at  an  early  stage  of  the 
transformation  process,  broad  participation  by  official  creditors  had 
to  be  ensured  in order to fill the  remaining  financing  gap. 
As  a  result,  the  Commiosion,  ac  coordinator  of  the  Twenty-Four,  has 
presented  in  close  cooperation  with  the  IMF  four  propocalo  for  G-24 
financing  packagec  in  favour  of  Hungary,  Czechoslovakia,  Bulgaria  and 
Romania,  designed  to  complement  the  resources  provided  by  the 
multilateral  financial  institutions.  The  participation  of  the  European 
Community  in  the  different  packages  has  been  based  on  the  principle 
that  the  Community  would  contribute  approximately  half  of  the  required 
additional  financing  with  the  expectation  that  the  other  G-24  member 
countries would,  together,  commit  an equivalent  amount. 
2.  General  features of the initiative 
The  medium-term  financial  accistance initiative has  been  implemented  by 
the  Community  and  the  G-24  on  a  cace-by-case  basis  subject  to  come 
commonly  agreed  guidelinec. 
Complementarity:  the acsictance  is additional to resourcec  from  the 
IMF  and  other multilateral  institutions that arc being mobilised to 
strengthen the  recerve position  and  improve  the balance of  payments 
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The  basic  prerequicite  for  thic  complementary  acoictance  ic 
concidered  to  be  the existence of  a  significant  reoidual  financing 
gap  decpite  the  implementation  of  a  strong  economic  programme  of 
stabilisation  and  comprehencive  rcformc  cupported  by  the  IMF  and 
other multilateral  financial  inctitutionc. 
The  coordinated  accistance  includeo  grantc,  official  guaranteec  or 
medium-term  loanc  provided  thece  are  untied.  Untied  parallel 
financing  of  World  Bank  ctructural  adjuctment  loanc  is aloe  deemed 
to  qualify  for  inclusion  to  this  initiative.  The  interest  rate  of 
the  loans  normally  reflects  the  cost  of  borrowing  on  the  capital 
marketc  of  the contributing countriec. 
When  the  loam:;  are  to  be  disburoed  in  more  than  one  tranche, 
macroeconomic  performance criteria are attached  to the  loans  baced 
on  the  conditionality  agreed  with  the  IMF.  Structural  adjuotment 
criteria  may  also  be  included  with  a  view  to  helping  safeguard  the 
momentum  of  the  economic  reform  procecc  over the madium  term. 
3.  Implementation of the initiative 
The  financial  ascistance  initiative  hao  for  1991  resulted  in  support 
packages  for  Czechoslovakia,  Hungary,  Bulgaria  and  Romania.  Overall, 
these  four  countriec  requested  exceptional  financial  acoiotance  from 
the  G-24  totalling  US$  3.3  billion  (ecu  2.44  billion).  Following  the 
European  Parliament' c  favourable  opinion  on  all  four  relating 
Commission  proposals,  the  Council  approved  the  contributionc  by  the 
European  Community  for  Czechoslovakia  (Oecicion  9/106/EEC  of  25 
February  1991),  Hungary  (Decicion  91/310/EEC of  24  June  1991),  Bulgaria 
(Decicion  91/311/EEC  of  24  June  1991)  and  Romania  (Decioion  91/384/EEC - 3  -
of  22  July  1991)  in the  form  of medium-term  loans,  in the  amounts  of  up 
to  ecu  375  million,  ecu  180  million,  ecu  290  million  and  ecu  375 
million,  a  total of  ecu  1.22  billion respectively,  representing  roughly 
50  percent  of  the  total  exceptional  financial  assistance  requested1). 
In  each  cane,  the  Community  loans  were  made  available  in  two 
instalments.  The  disbursement  of  the  first  instalment  was  conditional 
upon  the  conclusion  of  an  arrangement  with  the  Fund2 l;  the 
disbursement  of  the  second  instalment  was  subject  to  the  fulfilment  of 
conditions  set  out  in  a  Memorandum  of  Understanding  agreed  by  the  EC 
Commission  and  the  authorities  of  each  country  after  consultation  of 
the  Monetary  Committee.  These  conditions  included  quantified  macro-
economic  performance  criteria  identical  to  those  in  the  arrangements 
with  the  IMF,  and  structural  adjustment  criteria  designed  to  evaluate 
progress with respect to the  implementation of  structural policies. 
The  stabilization  and  reform  programmes  supported  by  the  Community  and 
G-24  balance  of  payments  assistance  presented  common  features. 
Hungary,  Czechoslovakia,  Bulgaria  and  Romania,  although  from  different 
initial  conditions,  all  embarked  in  1991  upon  contprehensive  programmes 
of  transformation  from  highly  centralized  planned  systems  to  market 
oriented  economies,  while  stabilizing  the  financial  situation.  The 
attempt  to reform and  adapt  the economic  structure for  integration into 
the  world  economy  involved  far-reaching  reforms  to  move  quickly  to the 
desired  market-based  productive  structure,  including  liberalization 
of  foreign trade;  price liberalization and  a  substantial elimination of 
price  subsidies;  privatization  and  restructuring  of  state enterprises; 
unification  of  exchange  rate  and  introduction  of  current  account 
convertibility;  and  financial  sector reform  (Table  1).  With  respect to 
the  exchange  rate,  both  Hungary  and  Czechoslovakia  adopted  a  peg  as  a 
nominal  anchor;  Bulgaria  and  Romania,  for  lack  of  foreign  exchange 
reserves,  let the  interbank market  determine the exchange rate. 
The  programmes  were  implemented  in  the  context  of  an  external 
environment significantly harder than initially envisaged,  notably with 
regard  to  the  greater-than-expected  decline  in  trade  with  the  ex-CMEA 
countries,  especially the  USSR.  These  difficulties  were  aggravated  in 
the  case  of  Bulgaria  and  Romania  by  a  shortfall  in  pledges  from  non-
Community  G-24  countries  and delays  in the disbursement of  commitments. 
In  the  circumstances,  the  decline  in  output  turned  out  to  be  larger 
than  expected  and  inflationary  pressures  persisted  in  most  economies 
(Table 2). 
However,  the  countries  benefitting  from  assistance  from  the  Community 
and  the G-24  determinedly  implemented the  programme  measures,  including 
price and  trade liberalization,  cautious  financial  and  income  policies, 
1)  In  1990,  the  Council  had  already  granted  a  medium-term  balance  of 
payments  loan to Hungary  in the  amount  of  ecu  870  million  (Decision 
90/83/EEC  of  22  February  1990),  without  contributions  from  G-24 
members. 
2)  In  the  case  of  Bulgaria,  owing  to  the  critical  external  debt 
situation of  the  country,  the  disbursement  of  the  first  instalment 
was  also  conditional  upon  the  conclusion  of  a  rescheduling 
agreement  on  official  debt  with  Bulgaria's  Paris . Club  creditors, 
the  conclusion  of  a  deferral  of  the  commercial  debt  servicing 
paymento  with  Bulgaria' o  commercial  bank  creditors,  and  progreso 
towardo  concluding  a  long-term  reocheduling  agreement  for  this 
debt. - 4  -
fiscal  and  financial  reform  and  liberalization of  the  exchange  regime. 
In  addition,  the  authorities  introduced  a  series  of  important 
structural  meaoures,  with  the  aim  of  liberalizing  private  economic 
activity,  privatizing  otate  aooets  and  building  the  legal  and 
institutional  framework  necescary  for  the  efficient  functioning  of  a 
market-based  economy.  In  view  of  the performance  achieved  with  regard 
to  the  quantified  performance  criteria  and  the  structural  adjustment 
criteria,  the  review  of  the  conditionality  attached  to  the  Community 
loans  wao  positively concluded  in all countries  and  the assistance  from 
the  Community  for  1991  was  entirely disbursed. 
While  all  the  countries  have  achieved  impressive  results,  there  hao 
been  significant  differences  in  performance  among  them,  some  of  which 
originating  from  the  considerable  diversity  in  the  initial  conditions 
that  the  varioun  countries  faced  at  the  ctart  of  the  reform  proceGG. 
Consequently,  the  advancement  of  the  procesc  of  return  to  external 
viability  has  varied  considerably  among  the  countries.  In  particular, 
Hungary  and  Czechoslovakia experienced  rapid progress  towards  accesG  to 
international  capital  markets,  whereas,  as  anticipated,  the 
mobilization of external private funding  remained  modest  in the case of 
Bulgaria  (burdened  by  an  external  debt  overhang)  and  Romania,  which 
relied  heavily  on  credit  from  official  sources  to  finance  their 
external deficit  in  the short run. 
In  Hungary,  which  had  already  made  considerable  strides  in  the  reform 
and  opening-up  of  ito  economy  before  the  political  liberalization  of 
1989-1990,  the  Community  and  G-24  aosistance  (which  followed  the 
decision  on  a  previouo  Community  loan  in  1990)  was  primarily  designed 
to  help  maintain  external  creditworthineoc.  The  pledging  of  the  1991 
package  was  completed without difficultieo. 
The  achievements  of the Hungarian  economy  in  1991  have  been  impreooive. 
External  borrowing  from  private  sourceo  reached  some  US$  1.5  billion, 
thereby  illustrating  the  return  of  confidence  by  financial  marketn. 
Furthermore,  the  country conoolidated its ponitive external  performance 
by  running  a  surplus  in convertible currency trade,  which  resulted  from 
a  successful  shift  of  trade  towardo  the  Went.  Connequently,  no 
additional exceptional  financing  io required for  1992. 
For  Czechoslovakia,  the  early  assuranceo  for  a  complementary  financial 
support  package  permitted  the  government  to  embark  in  January  1991  on 
an  ambitious  reform  programme,  baoed  on  a  rapid  liberalization  of 
prices  and  of  foreign  trade.  The  foreign  financial  aosiotance  was 
primarily to be  uoed  to otrengthen the reserve position of  the country, 
and  allowed  the  government  to  introduce  current  account  convertibility 
for  the  crown  and  to  peg  the  currency  to  a  basket  of  five  foreign 
currencies. 
The  combination  of  oubstantial  external  oupport  with  oucceooful 
domentic  and  monetary policieo reoulted in  a  conniderable  otrengthening 
of  the  foreign  currency  holdingo  of  Czechoolvakia,  implying  that  for 
1992  no  additional  exceptional  financing will be  required. 
The  assistance effort  has  however  been  more  complicated  in  the  case  of 
Bulgaria  and  Romania.  For  Bulgaria,  total  pledgen  for  asoistance  to 
fill  a  financing  gap  of  US$  BOO  million  fell  nhort  by  oome  US$  200 
million.  In  addition,  G-24  countrieo  who  participated  in  the - 5  -
initiative  faced  difficulties  in  concluding  their bilateral  agreements 
with  the  Bulgarian  authorities.  As  a  result,  only  minor  amounts  have 
been  disbursed outside the amounts  committed  by  the  Community. 
It  is  nevertheless  clear  that  also  in  the  case  of  Bulgaria  the 
commitments  from  the  international  community  were  instrumental  in 
allowing  the  country  to  introduce  partial  convertibility  of  its 
currency  as  part  of  a  comprehensive  reform  programme.  In  addition  the 
international  support  effort  enabled  the  country  to  initiate  the 
discussions  on  an  agreement with its bank creditors.  However,  owing  to 
the  fragile  external  position  of  the  country,  a  continued  financial 
backing by  the international  community will also be  needed  in  1992. 
The  case of  Romania  is a  particular one.  Because of  domestic political 
developments,  the  country  was  faced  with  the  problem  of  gaining 
international  political  credibility.  Nevertheless,  the  authorities 
remained  committed  to  far-reaching  economic  reforms  which  required 
substantial  external  support.  As  in the  case of  Bulgaria,  pledges  to 
fill  the  US$  1  billion gap  as  identified by  the  IMF  fell  short  by  some 
US$  250  million,  which  resulted  in  some  delays  in  the  unification  of 
the exchange rate. 
The  country  which· continues  to  be  deprived  from  sufficient  private 
financing  will  need  additional  financial  assistance  in  1992  in  support 
of its reforms. 
4.  Conclusions 
The  implementation  of  the  medium-term  financial  assistance  initiative 
in  1991  suggests  that  the  Community  and  G-24  balance  of  payments 
assistance  has  been  instrumental  in  improving  the  mix  between 
adjustment  and  financing  in the  CEEC  and  in maintaining the momentum  of 
economic  reforms.  Contraction  of  domestic  activity  and,  hence, 
employment  in  these  countries  would  have  been  significantly  larger  in 
the  absence  of  this  initiative.  In  this  regard,  it  is  important  to 
underline  that  the  coordinated  effort  has  permitted  to  mobilize  more 
assistance  than  would  have  been  likely  to  be  forthcoming  in  a  purely 
bilateral context. 
Overall,  and  this is clearly recognized throughout the region,  there is 
no  doubt  that  the  Community  and  the  G-24  have  played  a  major  role  in 
supporting the  economic  reform process  and thereby  in strengthening the 
democratic  forces  in Central  and Eastern Europe. 
For  Hungary  and  Czechoslovakia,  the  initiative  has  proven  to  be  fully 
successful  as  these countries do  not require  in  1992  additional  funding 
from  the  Community  and  the G-24.  Nevertheless,  the  Community  and  G-24 
have  to  respond  this  year  to  further  requests  from  Bulgaria,  Romania 
and  possibily  other  CEEC  (Albania,  the  Baltica  etc.)  t~ sustain  their 
stabilisation and  reform efforts. - 6  -
The  pre~ent  report,  ~ubmitted  in  accordance  with  Council  deci~ion~ 
90/83/EEC,  91/106/EEC,  91/310/EEC,  91/311/EEC  and  91/384/EEC,  regarding 
medium-term  financial  a~si~tance  from  the  Community  to  Hungary,  the 
Czech  and  Slovak  Federal  Republic,  Bulgaria  and  Romania,  assesses  the 
evolution  of  the  economic  oituation  of  each  country  in  1991,  the 
progre~o  of  economic  reform~  with  particular  reference  to  the 
implementation  of  the  conditione  attached  to  the  loan~,  and  the 
prospect~ for  1992. Privatization 
Liberalization  of  prices 
Exchange  rate  regime 
Monetary  Policy 
Trade  regime 
Foreign  investment 
TABLE  1  :  STATUS  OF  ECONOMIC  REFORM 
HUNGARY  CZECHOSLOVAKIA 
Government  committed  to  reduce  state  owned  property  to 
less  than  SOX  of  total  assets  in  the  competitive sector  of 
economy  by  1993. 
Around  90X  of  total  consumer  prices  were  liberalized  at 
end-1991 
Exchange  rates  unified  and  current  account  convertibility 
(at  enterprise  and  trade  organizations  level)  de  facto 
introduced.  Further  enhancements  expected  in  1992.  At 
present  forint  is  pegged  to  a  simplified  currency  basket 
based  on  equal  shares  of  ecus  and  dollars 
Independent  central  bank;  main  policy  objectives  include 
keeping  inflation under  control  and  achieving  a  balance  of 
payments  equilibrium.  Credit  policy  through  interest  rate 
Some  90X  of  imports  liberalized  with  the 
restricted  negative  list  (sensitive 
commodities).  Average  custom  tariff  level 
to  13X 
exception  of  a 
and  strategic 
lowered  from  16 
No  limits  on  equity  participation  in  enterprises  by  non-
residents.  Free  repatriation  of  profits  and  proceeds  of 
liquidation of  investment  by  non-residents. 
Small  enterprise  privatization  to  be  co~pleted in  1992. 
Large  :  voucher  system  initiated.  First  round  to  be 
completed  in  Summer 
Total  turnover  based  on  free  prices  estimated  at  94% 
Unification  of  exchange  rates  and  introduction  of 
current  account  convertibility  end  1991.  Pegging  of 
crown  to  basket  of  5  major  currencies 
Independent  central  bank;  tight  credit  policy  through 
credit  ceilings  and  interest  rate  policy  to  prevent 
inflationary spiral 
Imports  liberalized;  temporary  import  surcharge  on 
consumer  goods  reduced  from  20X  to  10Y.  in  January  1992 
No  limits  on  equity  participation  in  enterprises  by 
non-residents.  Free  repatriation  of  profits  and 
proceeds  of  liquidation  of  investment  by  non-residents. 
--J Privatization 
Liberalization of  prices 
Exchange  rate  regime 
Monetary  policy 
Trade  regime 
Foreign  Investment 
BULGARIA 
Small  privatization  to  be  initiated  shortly.  large 
conglomerates  to  be  dismantled  and  converted  in  joint 
stock  co~panies.  Privatization  law  passed.  I~plementation 
expected  to start  in  1992 
Close  to  90X  of  prices  were  freed  in  1991 
Unification  of  exchange  rates;  free  floating  of  exchange 
rate  through  interbank  market.  No  restrictions  on  most 
current  account  transactions. 
Tight  monetary  policy  by  independent  Central 
counter  Inflationary  pressures;  positive  real 
rates 
Bank  to 
interest 
Imports  liberalized.  Export  liberalization  through 
elimination of  taxes  and  reduction of  list  of  restrictions 
(licenses  and  export  bans) 
Liberal  foreign  investment  law  allowing direct  Investment. 
Free  repatriation  of  profits  and  proceeds  of  liquidation 
of  Investment  by  non-residents. 
ROHAN IA 
Small  privatization  through  breaking  up  of  viable 
assets  of  large  firms  and  auctioning.  Large 
privatization:  pilot project  initiated  in  92 
Broad  liberalization  of  prices.  List  of  15  products 
stilt controlled 
Unification  of  exchange  rates  in  November  1991.  Current 
account  convertibility  with  managed  float. 
Strict  control  of  monetary 
central  bank,  but  undesired 
lnterenterprise arrears 
policy  by  independent 
money  creation  through 
No  quantitative  import  restrictions.  Export  quotas  for 
limited  list of  products 
No  1  imits  on  equity  participation  in  enterprises  by 
non-residents.  Free  repatriation  of  profits  and 
proceeds  of  liquidation of  investment  by  non-residents. 
():) Table  2 
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Central and Eastern European countrieo 
Selected Economic  Indicatoro 
1989  1990  1991 
Actual  Actual  Programme  Latest 
estimates 
GOP  at conetant pricee  (Percent  changes) 
Bulgaria  0  -12  -11  -23 
Czech  and  Slovak Republic  0  -5  -16 
Hungary  0  -4  -4  -10 
Romania  -6  -7  0  -13 
Conoumerfretail prices  (end year) 
Bulgaria  10  64  234  339 
Czech  and  Slovak Republic  2  18  30  54 
Hungary  19  33  31  32 
Romania  104  223 
Fiocal balance  - Caoh  (Percent of  GOP) 
Bulgaria  -1.4  -9.2  0.1  -3.7 
czech  and  Slovak Republic  -2.4  -0.1  0.8  -2.0 
Hungary  -0.8  -0.1  -1.5  -4.1 
Romania  8.4  0.1  -1.5  -2.6 
Broad  Money  (Percent  change) 
Bulgaria  11  12  24  25 
Czech  and  Slovak Republic  4  1  6  27 
Hungary  14  29  23  29 
Romania  6  17  15  94 
Current account  (convertible)  (in billions of us  dollars) 
Bulgaria  -1.3  -1.2  -2.9  -0.9 
Czech  and  Slovak Republic  0.4  -1.1  -2.5  0.2 
Hungary  -1.4  0.1  -1.2  0.3 
Romania  2.9  -1.7  -1.7  -1.4 
Official Foreign  Exchange  Reserves  (level) 
Bulgaria  1.0  0.1  0.5  0.4 
Czech  and  Slovak Republic  1.1  0.5  1.7  1.4 
Hungary  1.7  1.1  1.9  4.0 
Romania  1.9  0.5  1.0  0.2 
Sources  National  authorities - 10  -
II.  HUNGARY 
1.  Introduction 
In  the  autumn  of  1989  Hungary  reached  a  critical  turn  in  its  recent 
history.  Although  for  several  years  the  country  had  been  gradually 
implementing  market-oriented  reforms  with  the  support  of  the  IMF  and 
the  World  Bank,  in  1989  domestic  and  external  economic  performance 
started  to  deteriorate  sharply,  a  large  current  account  deficit 
appeared,  which  further  strained  the  already  precarious  external 
financial  position of  the  country. 
At  the  Paris  Summit  in  July  1989,  the  major  industrial  countries 
decided  to  implement  a  special  initiative,  to  be  coordinated  by  the  EC 
Commission,  to  assist  Hungary  and  Poland.  The  Hungarian  authorities 
subsequently  asked  the  European  Community  to  provide  supplementary 
medium-term  financial  assistance  aimed  at  helping  the  country  to  meet 
its  growing  debt  servicing  burden,  strengthen  its  reserve  position, 
introduce  current  account  convertibility,  and  support  the  overall 
balance  of  payments.  As  a  result  of  this  request  and  on  a  proposal  by 
the Commission,  the Council  agreed  in  February  1990  (Decision  90/83/EEC 
on  22.2.1990)  to  grant  Hungary  a  medium-term  balance  of  payments  loan 
of  ECU  870  million. 
The  loan  was  to  be  disbursed  in  three  tranches,  the  first  tranche  of 
ecu  350  million  being  conditional  upon  the  conclusion  of  a  stand-by 
agreement  between  Hungary  and  the  IMF.  The  amounts  and  the  timing  of 
the  following  tranches  were  to  be  decided  later.  Following  the 
adoption  of  the  IMF  stand-by  arrangement  in  March  1990  and  the 
subsequent  signature  of  a  Memorandum  of  Understanding  between  the  EC 
Commission  and the Hungarian authorities,  which  described the terms  and 
conditions  attached  to  the  Community  loan,  the  first  tranche  of  the 
loan  (ECU  350 million)  was  disbursed  in early April  1990. 
A  review  of  progress  in  economic  stabilization  and  reform,  as  well  as 
the  monitoring  of  a  number  of  performance  criteria  agreed  with  the 
Hungarian  authorities  and  laid  down  in  the  Memorandum,  was  carried out 
at  the  end  of  1990.  This  led  to  a  Council  decision  in  February  1991 
for  the disbursement  of  a  second  tranche of  the  loan  (ECU  260 million). 
In  early  1991  Hungary  requested  and  obtained  further  assistance  from 
the  IMF  in the  form  of  an  Extended  Financing Facility  (EFF)  and  access, 
under  the  "oil  window",  to  the  Fund's  Compensatory  and  Contingency 
Financing Facility. 
However,  the  Fund's  assistance  was  not  expected  to  be  sufficient  to 
cover  all  the  exceptional  financing  needs  for  1991.  Accordingly, 
Hungary  requested  complementary  financial  assistance  from  the  Community 
and  the  Group  of  Twenty-Four.  The  need  for  such  supplementary 
assistance was  assessed  by  the Commission  services  in  close cooperation 
with  the  IMF  staff  and  was  estimated at  some  USS  500  million. 
approved  a  further  Community 
180  million  (approximately  50% 
of  the  country  for  1991). 
In  June  1991,  the  Council  of  Ministers 
financial  assistance  to  Hungary  of  ecu 
of  the  total  uncovered  requirements 
(Decision  91/310/EEC  on  24.6.1991). 
million)  of this  new  loan  was  disbursed 
The  first  tranche  (ECU  100 
in early August  on  the basis of - ll -
a  second  Memorandum  of  Underntanding  agreed  between  the  Commission  and 
the  Hungarian  authorities  in  July  1991.  The  Comminsion  also 
coordinated the  contributions of  the  non-Community  G-24  members. 
In  late  1991  the  Hungarian  authorities  requested  the  Commission  to 
consider  the  disbursement  of  the  remaining  tranches  of  the  EC  loans  to 
Hungary.  Following  a  review  of  Hungary's  economic  situation  and 
fulfilment  of  performance  criteria  the  second  tranche  (ECU  80  million) 
of  the  second  loan  is being  disbursed.  Owing  to  a  better than  expected 
performance  of  the  country's  balance  of  payments,  it  was  agreed  with 
the  Hungarian  authorities  that  the  release  of  the  third  tranche  of  the 
1990  loan would  be  considered at  a  later stage,  possibly  in  1993. 
The  loans  have  been  particularly  successful  in  achieving  their 
objectives  to  support  Hungary  at  a  difficult  financial  juncture  to 
undertake  fundamental  reforms  towards  establishing  an  open  market 
economy.  In  1991,  financial  market  confidence  has  been  rentored,  the 
external  position  of  the  country  han  been  connolidated  and  the  reform 
process  has  advanced  substantially. 
2.  General  economic  developments  in  1991 
The  Hungarian  economy  in  1991  was  faced  with  a  number  of  shockn, 
including  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  economy,  a  severe  deprennion 
affecting Hungary's  former  CMEA  partners,  the transition  from  rouble to 
dollar  settlements  in  CMEA  trade,  the  general  scarcity  of  convertible 
currency  in the  region  as well  as  unstable  international  energy prices. 
Despite these extremely difficult circumstances,  the 
was  able  to  continue  to  adjust  in  1991  as  well  as 
Hungarian  economy 
to  proceed  with 
economic  and  administrative  reform.  In  some  areas  results  were  more 
favourable  than  originally  forecasted,  especially  with  respect  to  the 
country's external situation. 
2.1  Output  and  demand 
GOP  is entimated to  have  declined  by  10.2%  in  1991,  about  6  percentage 
points  more  than  expected.  This  figure,  however,  docs  not  take  full 
account  of  the  dynamic  development  of  the  small  private  sector,  which 
is  estimated  to  be  growing  by  20  to  40~  annually.  Output  in  the 
industrial sector declined  by  19.1%  in  1991.  The  collapnc  in  CMEA  trade 
and  the  contraction  in  domestic  consumption  and  investment  were  the 
main  factors  behind  this  worse-than-expected  economic  performance. 
Those  primarily  affected  were  large,  state-run  enterprises,  which  were 
more  dependent  on  exports  to the  Soviet  Union. 
Production  in  the  agricultural  sector  fell  by  3%  in  1991.  This  was 
largely  due  to  the  reorganization  of  production,  operations  and 
ownership structure which  is currently under  way. 
Private  consumption  continued  to  contract  in  1991  (-9.5%)  as  a  direct 
consequence  of  the  erosion  of  real  incomes  (-9.8%).  Gross  fixed 
investment  fell  by  5. 5%  in  19'31  over  the  previous  year  (at  constant 
prices).  Despite the government's  determination  to  keep  inflation under 
control,  the  consumer  price  index  rose  by  35't  in  1991  (29%  in  1990). 
Th,e  main  reasons  for  faster  inflation  were  a  new  round  of  subsidy 
reductions  introduced  in  1991,  energy  price  rises  and  a  higer-than-
expected  budget  deficit. - 12  -
Unemployment  grew  rapidly  in  1991,  the  number  of  unemployed  reaching 
406,000  or  8.5~ of  the  labour  force  at year-end  (80,000  or  1.7~ at  the 
end  of  1990).  The  rising  unemployment  was  a  direct  consequence  of  the 
structural  changes  tilking  place  in  the  economy,  particularly  in  the 
industrial  sector.  On  the  positive  side,  it  should  be  noted  that  new 
employment  opportunities  have  been  created  in  those  dynamic  sectors 
where  private  initiative  is  more  prevalent,  such  as  services, 
construction  and  small-scale  industry. 
2.2  Budget 
The  budget  deficit has  expanded  rapidly  and  was  estimated at  more  than 
4%  of  GOP  for  1991,  overshooting  the  initial target  by  one  percentage 
point  of  GOP,  mainly  ao  .a  result  of  higher  than  expected  falls  in 
revenue.  The  collapse  of  the  CHEA  market  and  the  decline  in  domestic 
demand  led  to  lower-than-expected  revenues  from  import  levies  and 
duties,  VAT  and  personal  income  tax.  Spending,  on  the  other  hand,  wan 
kept  within  the  budgetary  1 imits.  Considerable  savings  were  achieved 
through  the  reduction  of  government  subsidies  for  consumer  goods, 
investment  and  housing. 
2.3  Trade balance,  current account,  international reserves  and  external 
borrowing 
During  1990  and  1991  Hungary  achieved  a  significant  reorientation  of 
its  foreign  trade  from  CHEA  (and  the  USSR  in  particular)  to  Western 
markets.  This  reflected  the  government's  policy  of  encouraging 
enterprises  to  restrict  their  trade  relations  with  former  CHEA 
partners,  and  the  ability  of  Hungarian  exporters  to  penetrate  EC 
marketo,  in particular.  At  present  some  70%  of  total  Hungarian  exports 
go  to  industrialized  countries,  while  exporto  to  former  CMEA  countrieo 
represent  a  mere  19%  of  the total. 
As  a  result of  this  trend,  in  1991  Hungary  was  able  to  consolidate  ito 
positive  external  performance  deopite  the  fact  that  the  collapse  of 
Eaot  European  markets  and  the  shift to  hard  currency  accounting  cauoed 
an  estimated  terms-of-trade  laos  of  around  US$2  bn.  In  1991,  the 
country's trade balance  (in convertible currencies)  showed  a  surpluo of 
US$  189  million  (compared  with  a  surplus  of  US$  248  million  in  1990) 
and  the  current  account  (in  convertible  currencies)  a  surplus  of  US$ 
267  million,  reflecting  a  levelling  off  of  interest  payments  on  the 
external  debt  and  a  substantial  surplus  on  the  tourism  account.  The 
current  account  surplus  in  convertible  currencies  in  1991  wao 
considerably  higher  than  the  US$  128  million  surplus  recorded  in  1990 
and  the  US$  1.2  bn deficit originally forecast  for  1991. 
It  io  worth  noting  that  the  non-convertible  balance  of  payments  also 
recorded  a  surpluo,  though  declining,  both  in  the  trade  balance  (US$ 
175  million)  and  in  the  current  account  (US$  144  million). 
Transactions  in roubleo  were  phaoed  out  in  the  second  half of  1991. 
International  reserves  in  foreign  currencies  expanded  from  US$  1.1  bn 
in  1990  to  4  bn  at  end-1991,  equivalent  to  4  months'  exports.  As  of 
end-1991,  gross  external  debt  stood  at  around  US$  22.7  bn,  subject  to 
fluctuations  arising  from  movements  in  the  dollar.  The  maturity 
structure  of  the  external  debt  continued  to  improve  during  1991:  the 
share  of  medium- and  long-term  debt  in  the  total  increased  to  91't 
(86.2%  in  1990).  Thin  proceos,  associated  with  the  expansion  of 
exports,  allowed  for  a  significant  reduction  of  the  country's  debt - 13  -
cervice ratio to around  30~  in  1991.  Interest  paymentc  amounted  to  US$ 
1.3  bn,  and  amortization  of  principal  to  US$  2.5  bn.  The  country  ic 
firmly  committed  to  service  promptly  its external  debt  obligations;  it 
continuec  to  maintain  normal  relatione  with  Western  commercial  banks 
and  its  creditworthiness  on  international  f inane ia  1  markets,  already 
saticfactory,  is  improving. 
Figurec  concerning  the  medium- and  long-term  external  borrowing 
programme  implemented  in 1991  suggect that the target of  US$  1.6 bn  for 
total external  borrowing  on  the  international  capital  marketc  and  from 
bankc  was  attained  by  the  end  of  the  year,  though  for  some  operations 
the  assessment  of  Hungary's  financial  risk  by  the  markets  entailed 
costs that were  higher  than expected. 
In  1991,  official  sources  provided  Hungary  with  further  loans  worth 
around  US$  2  bn  (US$  1  bn  disbursed  in  the  course  of  1990).  The  main 
sourceo  of  official  funds  were  the  IMF,  EC  and  G-24  for  macroeconomic 
assistance,  the  World  Bank  for  project  lending  and  structural 
adjustment purposes  and Japan's  Ex-Im  Bank. 
Finally,  foreign  direct  investment  also developed  promisingly  in  1991, 
reaching  US$  2.5  bn,  of  which  total  capital  inflows  amounted  to  US$ 
1.  45  bn. 
2.4  Monetary,  credit and  exchange  rate policies 
In  1991  Hungary  continued  to  implement  a  restrictive  monetary  and 
credit policy,  which  focused  in particular on  stabilizing the domestic 
currency  and  controlling inflationary pressures.  This  was  in line with 
the  agreements  reached  between  Hungary  and  the  IMF  in  March  1990  for  a 
12-month  atand-by  arrangement  and  in  February  1991  for  a  three-year 
Extended  Financing  Facility.  This  policy  was  implemented  by  the 
National  Bank  of  Hungary,  which  made  effective  use  of  traditional 
inotrumento  of  monetary  and  liquidity  control.  Demand  for  money  in 
1991  remained  however  oomewhat  high,  as  a  result  of  the  rising  budget 
deficit  and  the  growing  financial  needs  of  loss-making  public 
enterprioes  for  restructuring and  investment. 
Moreover,  oome  preferential  lending  continued  to  be  extended, 
particularly  to  state  enterprises  to  strengthen  their  production  and 
export  capabilities.  Unhealthy  financial  relations  between  banks  and 
enterprioeo  still  represent  a  major  source  of  concern  for  the 
government,  as  they  reflect  an  unsatisfactory  degree  of  financial 
discipline. 
During  1991,  short- and  long-term refinancing  rates  were  used  with  more 
flexibility.  The  NBH  basic  refinancing  rate  (rediscount)  was  raised  to 
22\  (+10\  on  the  previouo  year)  and  then  stabilized  at  that  level  in 
1991.  The  automatic  refinancing  of  commercial  banks  by  the  NBH  was 
reduced  to  10%  of  the  total  capital  of  the  main  commercial  banks,  the 
NBH  target  being  to  abolish  it completely  from  the  beginning  of  1992. 
The  lower  obligatory  reserve  requirements  introduced  for  commercial 
banko  in  1990  were  extended  in  1991  to  cover  foreign  currency  deposito 
ao  well.  Following  the  progressive  slowing  down  of  monthly  inflation 
in  1991  the  government  and  commercial  banks  began  to  lower  interest 
rateo. - 14  -
In  1991,  the  National  Bank  of  Hungary  adopted  an  active  exchange  rate 
policy.  The  forint  was  devalued  by  15%  in  January  1991  essentially  to 
preserve the country's external  position.  A  further  devaluation  of  5.8~ 
in  November  1991  was  intended  to offset part of  the  appreciation of  the 
real  exchange  rate  which  had  occurred  during  the  previous  months  as  a 
result of  inflation.  In  December  it was  decided to  peg  the  forint  to  a 
simplified  currency  basket  based  on  equal  shares  of  the  ecu  and  the 
dollar. 
3.  Statuo of reform process 
In  1991  the  government  continued  the  process  of  transforming  the 
economy  into  a  "social market  economy"  in  the  framework  of  a  three-year 
"Economic  Programme  of  National  Renewal"  issued  in  September  1990.  The 
programme,  supported  by  the  IMF,  focuses  on  the  need  to  carry  out 
macroeconomic  stabilization  and  anti-inflationary  policies  and  at  the 
same  time  to  implement  oocial  and  labour  market  measures  designed  to 
protect  those  segmento  of  the  population  most  affected  by  the 
transformation process. 
The  reorientation  of  foreign  trade  towards  western  markets  has  been 
reinforced  by  the signature of  a  Europe  Agreement.  Hungary's  access  to 
Western  high  technology  has  been  facilitated  by  the  COCOM  directive 
approved  in  1991,  which  reduced  the  number  of  items  on  the  prohibition 
and  licence list from  120  to  10. 
Proposals  for  a  free  trade  area  with  neighbouring  countries  have  been 
launched  in  the  framework  of  the  Visegrad  Accord  with  Poland  and 
Czechoslovakia.  Barter  and  other  forms  of  trade  arrangements  are 
pursued  particularly  with  the  Baltic  states  and  the  republics  of  the 
former  USSR.  In  this  respect,  the  country's  main  otrategic  aim  is  to 
reduce  its  heavy  dependence  on  energy  imports  from  one  source  and  to 
develop  new  markets  for  Hungarian  products.  It  appears  that  the 
Hungarian  economy  could  be  badly  hurt  by  the  war  in  Yugoslavia  and  the 
consequences  of  the  UN  trade  embargo  on  Serbia,  though  the  possible 
effects are difficult to quantify  at this stage. 
The  most  salient events  in  1991  were: 
3.1  Legislation 
Concesoiono  Act:  It  relateo  to  concessions  on  state  property.  These 
are  not  transferable  and  can  be  granted  for  a  specified  period  of  5  to 
35  years.  Foreigners  enjoy  the  same  rights  as  residents. 
Accounting  Act:  It conforms  with  the  international  norms. 
Law  on  Compensation:  It  refers  to  private  property  nationalized  after 
June  1949.  The  total  cost  of  the  programme  for  the  government  is 
expected  to  amount  to  Ft  70-90  bn.  The  law  will  assist  the 
privatization  process  by  removing  all  uncertainties  related  to  final 
ownership  and  property rights. 
Act  on  the Central  Bank:  It limits the extension of  credit to  finance 
the  national  budget  deficit  and  defines  the  tasks  of  the  Central  Bank 
(the  main  difference  with  Western  practice  is  the  stricter  control  on 
foreign  exchange  transactions).  The  Act  allows  the  government  to 
appoint  its representative  on  the  Board  of  Directors of  the  NBH. - 15  -
Law  on  Financial  Institutions:  The  Law  mainly  addresses  the ownership 
of  financial  institutions.  Shareholders  other  than  financial 
institutions  may  not  own  more  than  25%  of  commercial  banks'  and  other 
financial  institutions'  equity.  Foreign  investors  may  own  up  to  10% 
without  prior  approval.  The  law  also  defines  the  legal  status  and 
powers  of  the  State  Banking  Inspectorate  and  establishes  the  Deposit 
Protection  Fund,  which  limits  the  responsibility  of  the  State  Budget 
for  deposit  insurance. 
Law  on  Investment  companies:  The  law  is designed  to attract financial 
investors  and  to  speed  up  the  privatization  process,  particularly  in 
the industrial  sector. 
Law  on  Bankruptcy:  It  provides  for  rigorous  treatment  of  insolvency 
and  bankruptcy.  The  Hungarian  government  considers  this  law  as  the 
basis  for  re-establishing  normal  inter-enterprise  payments  in  the 
coming  months. 
3.2  Trade  Liberalization 
Encouraging  progress  was  also  made  in  1991  in  trade  liberalization. 
The  Hungarian  government  ended  its  monopoly  on  foreign  trade,  and  a 
number  of  new entities became  active  in  foreign  trade. 
Some  90%  of  imports  have  been  liberalized,  so  that  at  present  almost 
all  imports  and  exports  are  exempt  from  any  licensing,  with  the 
exception  of  a  negative  list  for  some  sensitive  and  strategic 
commodities.  The  average  customs  tariff  level  has  also  been  lowered 
from  16%  to  13%. 
Also  in  1991  antidumping  legislation  was  introduced,  as  well  as  new 
rules  against  market  disruption.  A  harmonized  custom  classification 
system  (following  EC  directives)  is being  introduced  in stages. 
3.3  Price liberalization 
Following  the  adoption  in  November  1990  of  a  new  Pricing  Act  and  the 
subsequent  abolition  of  the  Price  Commission,  a  new  round  of  price 
liberalization  was  effected  on  1  January  1991.  As  a  result  of  these 
measures,  'in  1991  only  about  10%  of  consumer  prices  remained  subject  to 
official price  fixing. 
3.4  Banking  reform  and  security market  development 
Since  the  establishment  of  a  two-tier  banking  system  in  1987,  37  new 
commercial  banks  have  been  granted  permission  to  operate  in  Hungary. 
A bill on  the  new  role of the National  Bank  of  Hungary  as  an  autonomous 
body  accountable  only  to  the  Parliament  was  approved  at  the  end  of 
1991. 
In  1991,  the  security  market  was  further  developed,  though  the  number 
of  companies  registered  at  the  Budapest  stock  exchange  remains  small 
(around  30)  and  the value of  transactions  is still modest. 
3.5 Joint Ventures 
As  of  end-1991  the  number  of  newly  established  joint  ventures  in 
Hungary  was  around  10,000,  compared  with  5,693  at  end-1990.  In  1991 
foreign  cash  inflows  were  about  US$  1.4 bn. - 16  -
Following  the  adoption  of  new  joint  venture  legislation  which  permits 
Western  undertakings  to  establish  fully  owned  companies  in  Hungary, 
some  1, 268  companies  were  funded  exclusively  with  foreign  capital  in 
1991.  More  than  half  of  the  joint  ventures  already  operating  are  in 
the  commercial  sector.  Industrial  ventures  represent  slightly  lens 
than  20\  of  the total. 
It appears  that  some  60\  of  total  foreign  investment  in  Eastern  Europe 
han  been directed to  Hungary. 
3.6 Privatization 
The  privatization  process  started  in  Hungary  in  1989,  but  progress  so 
far  has  been  slow.  The  government  set  up  the  State  Property  Agency 
(SPA)  in March  1990  in order to  implement  the  privatization  programme, 
manage  state  assets  while  they  were  being  privatized  and  ensure  a 
satisfactory  degree  of  transparency  in  the  process.  Its  aim  is  to  put 
half of  state property  into private  hands  by  1994.  Up  to  now,  however, 
the  strong  growth  of  the  private  sector  has  been  due  lens  to  the 
privatization  of  state-owned  companies  than  to  the  rapid  expansion  of 
new  enterprises,  aided  by  sizeable  infusions of  foreign  capital. 
The  main  reasons  behind the delays  in the privatization process  are the 
growing  management  problems  within  the  SPA,  the  difficulty  in 
distinguishing between asset valuation and  market  value when  drawing  up 
inventories  at  enterprise  level,  and  the  limitations  placed  by  a 
restrictive credit  policy  on  setting up  preferential  credit  facilities 
in  support  of  those  businesses  to  be  privatized.  Furthermore,  while 
sales of  state-owned  consumer  goods  companies  to Western multinationals 
have  been  quite  successful,  the  privatization  of  less  financially 
attractive manufacturing enterprises  is proceeding  slowly. 
3.7  Foreign direct  investment 
Additional  legislative  and  regulatory  measures,  such  as  foreign 
investment  protection  rules,  profit  repatriation,  foreign  investment 
liquidation,  etc.,  are  now  being  introduced  in  the  framework  of  the 
Association Agreement  signed with the  EC  in December  1991. 
4.  Review of performance criteria attached to the EC  loans 
Two  Memoranda  of  Understanding  were  signed  between  the  EC  Commission 
and  Hungary,  one  in  March  1990  and  one  in  July  1991,  describing  terms 
and  conditions  attached  to  the  EC  loano.  Both  Memoranda,  which  were 
agreed  after  com:;ultation  with  the  Monetary  Committee,  foresaw  the 
periodical monitoring of  an  agreed  set of  performance criteria  as  well 
as  major  structural  economic  and  sectoral  indicators.  Those  criteria 
generally  included  the  quantitative  criteria  stipulated  in  the  IMF 
arrangemento  (mainly  ceilings  on  money  supply  and  bank  credits  to  the 
state budget  as  well  as  targets on  budget deficit and  external  reserves 
and  liabilities)  as  well  as  objectives  for  the  current  account  and  the 
international  reserves,  price  and  import  liberalization,  reduction  of 
state-owned  property,  adoption  of  appropriate  legislative measures  and 
the  continuing  effort  to  mobilize  external  financing  from  private 
sources. 
The  results  achieved  by  the  Hungarian  authorities  at  the  end  of  1991 
with  respect  to  the  performance  criteria  were  broadly  in  compliance - 17  -
with  the  commitments  undertaken  in  the  Memoranda.  Performance  with 
respect  to  the  structural  adjustment  indicators  can  also  be  considered 
broadly  satisfactory.  A  relatively  rapid  process  of  transformation  of 
state owned  enterprises  into  joint stock or  limited  liability companies 
was  implemented  in  1991,  but  privatization  is  progressing  more  slowly 
than  initially  planned.  Figures  referring  to  the  number  of  newly 
established  joint  ventures  and  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises  show 
a  positive trend. 
Finally,  information  on  bankruptcy  and  liquidation 
in  1991  or  completed  during  1991  illustrates 
microeconomic  transformation process. 
5.  Developments  in  1992 
procedures  started 
progress  on  the 
The  decline  in  output  continued  during  the  first  months  of  1992, 
industrial  production  fell  a  neasonally  adjusted  17.3't  in  April  1992 
compared  to  a  year  earlier.  Monthly  price  increases  have  continued  to 
decelerate;  by  May  1992  the  year-on-year  consumer  price  increase  was 
22.6%.  The  number  of  unemployed  has  continued to rise,  reaching  523,000 
or  9.7%  of  the workforce  in  May.  However,  the  Hungarian  economy's  most 
signific~nt problem  remains  its  growing  budget  deficit,  which  exceeded 
Ft  69  bn  by  the  end  of  May.  Revenue  was  8.2%  less  than  expected  while 
expenditure  was  2.4'1.  less.  A  budget  deficit  of  Ft  160-180  bn  is  now 
forecast  for  the  full  year,  requiring  the  adoption  of  a  supplementary 
budget. 
Hungary  will  finance  the  1992  deficit  with  state  bondn  and  treasury 
bills,  as  well  as  with  special  bonds  issued  by  the  National  Bank  which 
will  be  uned  to  regulate  the  money  supply.  Spending  on  nocial 
programmes  in  scheduled  to  grow  by  23%  in  1992,  the  budget's  ningle 
biggest  area  of  growth,  in  order  to  alleviate  problems  created  by 
rising  unemployment  and  deteriorating  living  standards.  The  amount 
spent  on  subsidies  is  forecast  to  decrease  in  1992  to  Ft  139  bn, 
againnt  Ft  171  bn  in  1991.  on  the  revenue  side,  most  tax  and  duty 
payments  are  expected  to  rise  by  less  than  the  inflation  of  20-22% 
predicted  by  the  government,  with  the  exception  of  personal  income  tax 
and  consumer  tax,  which  are  scheduled  to  rise  by  28%  and  26% 
respectively. 
On  the  external  side,  during  the  first  four  months  of  1992  Hungary's 
trade  showed  a  further  remarkable  expansion,  in  particular  to 
industrialized  countries.  Exports  increased  by  some  23%  over  the  same 
period  of  last  year,  while  imports  grew  by  4%,  reflecting  a  still 
sluggish demand  for  imported  goods  by  local enterprises and  households. 
As  a  renult  of  this  favorable  trend,  according  to  NBH  figures,  at  the 
end  of  the  first  four  months  of  1992  Hungary  recorded  a  better-than-
cxpected trade surplus  (US$  612  million)  and  a  sizeable current  account 
surplus  (US$  485  million). 
No  further decline  in  Hungarian  trade with  former  CMEA  partners  and  the 
former  USSR  is expected  to occur  in  1992.  At  present all trade-related 
transactions  between  Hungary  and  this  zone  are settled  in  hard  currency 
or on  a  counter-trade basis. 
n~ the end of  May  1992  international  reserves  in  foreign  currencien  had 
increased to  US$  5  bn,  thus  covering  some  5.5  months'  imports. - 18  -
During  the  first  quarter  foreign  direct  investment  inflows  amounted  to 
an  estimated  US$  300  million,  reflecting  the  positive  Western 
perception of  Hungary's  investment  risk and  promising  profit prospects, 
despite  the  adoption  at  the  end  of  1991  of  more  restrictive  rules  on 
taxation  of  foreign  investment  and  the  abolition  or  reduction  of  some 
allowances  already granted  to  foreign  joint ventures.  Depending  on  the 
evolution of  the balance of  payments  in the  coming  months,  the external 
financing  requirement  for  1992  could  reach  US$  2-2.5  bn.  In  1992 
Hungary  expects  continuing  official  external  financial  assistance 
mainly  from  the  IMF  and  the  World  Bank,  totalling  US$  1.4  bn. 
Furthermore,  the  authorities  intend  to  implement  a  borrowing  programme 
with  a  view  to  raising  some  US$  1-1.3  bn  on  the  international  capital 
markets.  During  the  first  quarter,  approximately  65%  of  this  programme 
was  already  accomplished  on  the  German,  Japanese  and  Austrian  markets. 
Some  further  bank-to-bank  credit  lines  are  also  expected  to  be 
negotiated  by  the  NBH  during  the  current year. 
In  April  1992  international  rating  agencies  have  upgraded  Hungary's 
financial  risk.  As  of  end-April  1992,  the country's gross  foreign  debt 
in  convertible  currencies  had  stabilized  at  around  US$  22  bn,with  a 
debt  service  ratio  of  around  30%.  Its  price  on  the  secondary  debt 
market  has  been  stabilized at  around  88-90  cents  to the dollar. 1.  Introduction 
In  1991,  at  the 
assistance  was 
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Republic 
(hereafter  CSFR  or  Czechoslovakia},  in the context  of  the  initiative by 
the  G-24  Group,  and  in  addition  to  the  financing  provided  by  the  IMF 
and  the  World  Bank.  Accordingly,  the  Council  adopted  a  decision 
(Council  Decision  91/105/EEC  of  25.2.1991}  granting  financial 
assistance  of  ecu  375  million  to  Czechoslovakia.  The  loan  agreement, 
signed  on  29  May  1991,  was  designed  to  assist  the  country  in  its 
economic  reform  process  and  to  allow  for  a  successful  introduction  of 
currency  convertibility;  it  was  matched  by  an  equivalent  financial 
contribution  from  the other member  countries of  the  G-24  Group.  In  mid-
1991,  the  Commission  disbursed  ecu  185  million,  corresponding  to  the 
first  of  the  two  loan  tranches.  The  release  of  the  second  tranche  was 
subject  to  a  successful  review  of  progress  in  the  field  of  economic 
stabilisation  and  reform,  including  the  observance  of  a  number  of 
performance  criteria  agreed  by  the  two  parties.  After  a  positive 
review,  the  second tranche of  ecu  190  million was  disbursed  in  February 
1992. 
Early assurances of additional  financial  support  from  Western  countries 
permitted  the  government  to  embark  on  an  ambitious  reform  programme. 
The  foreign  financial  assistance  was  used  primarily  to  strengthen  the 
reserve  position  of  the  country,  and  allowed  the  government  to 
introduce  current  account  convertibility  for  the  crown  (koruna)  and  to 
peg  the  currency  to  a  basket  of  foreign  currencies.  As  a  result, 
substantial  external  support  combined  with  successful  domestic  fiscal 
and  monetary  policies  have  resulted  in  a  considerable  strengthening  of 
the  foreign  currency  holdings  of  the  CSFR,  implying  that  for  1992  no 
additional exceptional  financing  should  be  required. 
2.  Economic  reform  in 1991 
2.1  Initial conditions  in Czechoslovakia 
Czechoslovakia  embarked  on  the  transition  to  a  market  economy  in  late 
1990/early  1991  under  better  macroeconomic  conditions  than  other 
countries  in  transition.  Thanks  to  a  conservative  fiscal  and  monetary 
policy  over  the  past  decade,  inflation  had  never  emerged  as  a  serious 
problem,  the monetary overhang  was  relatively small,  hard-currency debt 
was  less than  15  % of GOP,  and  net  government  debt  was  negligible. 
Czechoslovakia  was  disadvantaged,  however,  compared  to e.g.  Poland  and 
Hungary,  with  regard  to  the  structure  of  the  economy  and  the  legal 
framework  and  basic  institutions:  concentration  in  industry  was  much 
higher,  the  private  sector  was  very  small,  and  exports  were  heavily 
biased  towards  East  European  countries  and  towards  heavy  industrial 
goods  and  armaments.  Furthermore,  frictions  between  the  different 
levels of  government  and  the  need  to deal  with  growing  tensions  between 
the  Czech  and  Slovak  republics,  and  the  Slovaks'  aspirations  for  more 
independence  put  additional  burdens  upon  the  reform  process. 
The  first steps to  reform the economic  and  institutional structure were 
taken  in  1990,  when  the  commercial  and  non-commercial.  exchange  rates - 20  -
for  the  crown  were  unified,  the  crown  was  devalued,  a  two-tier  banking 
system  was  created,  and  a  mixed  system of  centralized  and  decentralized 
prices was  introduced. 
However,  fundamental  economic  reforms  started  in  earnest  only  in  1991. 
More  than  a  year  later,  remarkable  successes  in  macroeconomic 
management  have  been  achieved,  with  prices  stable,  and  the  government 
and  external  accounts  close  to  balance.  But  output  has  fallen  sharply, 
and  structural  reform  is proving  to  be  slow  and  difficult. 
A  "Scenario  of  the  Economic  Reform"  adopted  by  the  Federal  Assembly  in 
September  1990  outlined  the  key  elementn  of  transformntion  policy. 
Corner  stones  of  this  programme  were  the  complete  liberalization  of 
prices  and  external  trade,  large-scale  privatization  and  a  rigorouo 
macroeconomic  stabilization policy. 
2.2  Price liberalization,  incomes  policy  and  supply-side policy 
In  January  1991,  prices  were  freed  and  most  subsidies  for  consumer 
goods  were  abolished.  A  General  Agreement,  concluded  by  the  Govern-
ment,  employers  and  trade  unions,  established  a  cap  on  wage  increases 
during  1991  consistent  with  a  decline  in  real  wages  of  10  percent, 
following  a  decline  of  about  the  same  magnitude  during  1990.  Although 
prices  rose  by  40%  in  the  first  quarter,  a  price-wage-price  spiral  was 
avoided.  Significant subsidies  for  housing  and  transport were,  however, 
maintained. 
2.3  Fiscal policy 
Fiscal  policy  was  designed  to  achieve  a  substantial  disengagement  of 
the  otate  from  the  economy  and  to  help  stabilize  the  economy  in  a 
turbulent period  following  trade  and  prize  liberalization and  the  terms 
of  trade  shock.  With  respect  to the microeconomic  perspective of  fiscal 
policy,  measures  were  taken  to  boost  investment  by  reducing  profit-tax 
rates  by  10  - 20  per  cent.  Also,  the  vast  number  of  turnover-tax  rates 
was  reduced  to  four,  subsidies  were  abolished  and  privatization  begun. 
From  the  macroeconomic  perspective,  fiscal  policy  aimed  at  an  overall 
budget  surplus  of  1%  of  GOP  while  the  ratio  of  revenue  to  GOP  wao 
supposed  to  fall  by  about  10  percentage  points.  Consequently,  a  small 
budget  surplus  could  only  be  achieved  with  the  help  of  considerable 
expenditure restraint. 
2.4  Privatization 
Important  elements  in  the  strategy  to  disengage  the  state  from  the 
economy  were  the privatization programmes  approved  by  parliament.  While 
small  privatization started  immediately  in  1991,  privatization of  large 
state enterprises was  intended to be  achieved mainly with  the help of  a 
voucher  system  in  the  course  of  1992.  Overall,  privatization  seems  to 
be  well  under  way.  Small-scale  privatization got  off  to  a  quick start; 
and  large-scale privatization  seems  to be  on  track. 
2.5  Monetary  policy 
Monetary  policy,  like  fiscal  policy,  was  designed  to  be  restrictive  oo 
as  to  bolster  the  exchange  rate  anchor  and  help  stabilize  prices.  A 
tight  credit  policy  was  intended  to ensure  that  the  initial price  jump 
did  not  trigger  a  process  of  protracted  inflation.  Credit  policy  haG 
consisted  mostly  of  direct  ceilings  on  commercial  banks.  While  ouch - 21  -
ceilings  create  inefficiencies  and  distortions,  the  rudimentary  nature 
of  financial  markets  made  it  impossible  to  rely  on  reserve  money 
management  and  other indirect  instruments.  The  state Bank,  however,  has 
already  introduced  a  number  of  measures  to  move  towards  a  system  of 
reserve  money  management,  and  intends  to  take  further  steps  in  this 
direction,  so  as  to  allow  for  the  implementation  of  monetary  policy 
through  market-based  instruments.  In  addition,  new  banking  laws  are  to 
be  introduced,  which  should  promote  the  independence  of  the  State  Bank 
and  foster  the  development  of  a  competitive  banking  system  (including 
the  participation  of  foreign  banks).  At  the  same  time  the  State  Bank 
has  kept  close  control  of  interest  rates  through  three  main 
instruments:  the  discount  rate,  a  maximum  lending  rate,  and  moral 
suasion  in  the  area  of  deposit  rates.  After  being  raised  to  10~  in 
early  1991  (from  5~  in  1990),  the discount  rate was  slightly lowered  in 
September to 9.5%. 
2.6 Trade  and  exchange  rate policy 
The  CSFR's  trade  regime  has  been  considerably  liberalized:  imports  and 
exports  may  now  be  undertaken  by  any  registered  enterprise  or  private 
entrepreneur;  import  licenses  are  required  only  for  a  small  number  of 
so-called  strategic  items,  whereas  all  commercial  imports  are  subject 
to  an  import  tariff,  ranging  from  0  to  35%.  The  temporary  import 
surcharge  on  consumer  goods  (reduced  to  10%  since  1  January  1992)  is 
expected  to expire  on  1  January  1993;  it was  originally  introduced  to 
avoid  import  surges  that  may  jeopardize  the  balance  of  payments 
position. 
Following  a  devaluation  at  the  end  of  1990,  the  crown  was  made 
convertible  for  current  account  transactions.  The  commercial  and 
tourist  exchange  rates  were  unified  at  the  same  time,  at  a  rate  of 
Kcs28  =  US$1.  Since then,  the crown  has  been  pegged  to  a  basket  of  five 
currencies,  which  has  resulted  in  a  relatively  stable  rate  against  the 
dollar  of  between  28  and  30  Kcs.  As  the  authorities  have  been 
successful  in keeping  inflation under  control,  there is little pressure 
to  devalue  the  crown.  In  fact,  owing  to  inflation  differentials,  the 
crown  has actually depreciated  in real terms vis-a-vis the  Polish  zloty 
and  the  Hungarian  forint.  In  March  1992,  the  real  effective  exchange 
rate  of  the  crown  against  the  dollar  was  7%  below  its  January  1990 
level. 
3.  General  economic developments  in  1991 
3.1  Production 
Czechoslovakian  output  suffered  a  serious  setback  in  1991  as  a  result 
of  several  factors,  not  all  linked  to  the  domestic  reform  process.  On 
the external side,  the fall  in exports to  former  CMEA  countries  reduced 
total  demand  for  Czechoslovakian  products  while  the  switch  of  CMEA 
trade  to  a  convertible  currency  base  implied  a  significant 
deterioration in the terms  of trade.  On  the internal  side,  the  pace  of 
the  reallocation  of  resources  (rapid  decline  in  output  in  existing 
branches  and  a  slow  and  hesitant start  in  building  new  structures),  as 
a  result  of  the  move  to  a  market  system  and  the  change  in  relative 
prices,  contributed  to  a  negative  output  shock.  Also,  restrictive 
monetary  and  fiscal  policy  in  the  aftermath  of  the  (unexpectedly  high) 
price  surge  in  early  1991  contributed  to  the  overall  contraction  of nupply.  Finally,  domentic 
wan  driven  down  by  large 
issues,  the  structure  of 
privatization. 
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demand,  especially  invcntment  expenditure, 
uncertainty  concerning  future  institutional 
relative  prices  and  the  consequences  of 
All  in  all,  real  GOP  declined  by  16%  in  1991,  and  both  in  the  Czech 
republic  and  in  Slovakia  the  decline  in  induntrial  production  reached 
more  than  20\,  and  construction  output  nhrank  by  about  one  third. 
According to official statisticn,  collective consumption  stagnated,  but 
per£Jonal  consumption  slumped  by  one  third,  and  net  investment  even 
became  negative  as  from  the third quarter. 
3.2  Labour  market 
Naturally,  the  labour market  was  negatively  affected  by  the major  slump 
in  output,  and  employment  declined  by  about  14%.  Unemployment,  which 
virtually did  not exist in early 1990,  reached  more  than  500,000  by  the 
end  of  1991,  and  the  unemployment  rate  climbed  to  about  7't.  Labour-
shedding  differed  very  significantly  between  regions.  While 
enterpri£Jes  in  the  Czech  republic  tried  to  avoid  major  lay-offs  by 
allowing  labour  productivity  to  decline  by  20  to  30%,  more  rigorous 
employment  adjustment  in  Slovakia  limited  the  decline  in  productivity 
to  10 to  15%  but  led to soa!ing unemployment.  Furthermore,  job creation 
in  the  growing  private  sector  (by  end-1991  about  1.2  million  out  of  a 
total labour  force  of 8.7  million were  employed  in  this sector,  some  of 
them  in  second  jobs)  was  mainly  taking  place  in  the  Czech  republic. 
Consequently,  despite  similar  falls  in  industrial  and  construction 
output,  unemployment  rates  in  Slovakia  ( 12%)  were  about  three  times 
higher than  in  the Czech  republic  (4%)  in  late  1991. 
3.3  Inflation and  wages 
Following  price  liberalization  in  January  1991,  prices  at  the  producer 
and  retail  level  jumped  on  average  by  about  45%.  The  magnitude  of  the 
price  jump  exceeded  the working  assumptions  used  to  formulate  economic 
policies  and  led  to  a  sharper  than  agreed  decline  in  real  wages  and  to 
a  tighter than  intended  fiscal  and  monetary  policy stance.  However,  the 
increase was  relatively small  compared  with  the  increases  in other East 
European  countries.  Furthermore,  the  first  surge  in  prices  worked 
itself  out  in  the  first  months  of  the  year  and  inflation  was  rapidly 
brought  under  control,  so  that  average  annual  inflation  was  limited to 
somewhat  above  SO%. 
Nominal  wages  grew  on  average  by  about  16%,  indicating  a  sharp decline 
in  real  wages.  Inter-sectoral  wage  differentiation  started  to  emerge: 
wages  in  the  service  sector,  where  prospects  were  rosy,  increased  by 
about  40%  (insurance sector)  to  60%  (banking  sector),  while  they  almost 
stagnated  in  the  agricultural  sector.  Pensions  were  raised  by  about 
30%. 
3.4  Public  finances 
The  fiocal  stance  in  .early  1991  was  substantially  tighter  than 
envioaged,  reflecting  on  the  revenue  side  a  temporary  surge  in  profit 
tax  receipts  (owing  mainly  to capital gains  on  inventories)  and  on  the 
expenditure  side  limitations  deoigned  to  support  the  anti-inflationary 
stance.  Thus  government  wages  and  transfers to private  houoeholds  were 
increased  with  a  £Jignificant  lag  following  the  larger  than  expected - 23  -
price  jump.  Furthermore,  subsidies  and 
postponed,  and  the  budget  showed  a  surplus 
the first six months  of  the year. 
capital  transfers  were 
of  more  than  2~  of  GOP  in 
In  the  second  half  of  the  year,  fiscal  policy  became  somewhat  more 
relaxed,  partly  as  a  result  of  less  buoyant  revenue  growth,  partly 
because  of  automatic  stabilizers  working  and  also  because  of 
discretionary  actions  of  the  government.  The  last  mainly  comprised  a 
reduction  in  VAT  rates,  increases  in  the  allocations  for  health  and 
education  and  once-off  compensations  to enterprises  negatively  affected 
by  the  effects  of  the  embargo  on  Iraq.  For  the  year  as  a  whole,  the 
deficit of all levels of  government  was  crown  18.5  billion,  about  2%  of 
GOP. 
3.5  Internal monetary  aspects 
As  price  increases  were  much  larger during  the  first  part  of  1991  than 
had  been  anticipated,  real  credit  contraction  was  correspondingly 
greater.  As  a  consequence,  monetary  policy  was  eased  somewhat  during 
the  second  part  of  the  year,  to  reduce  its  deflationary  impact.  The 
supply  of  credit  appears  to  have  been  constrained  by  a  number  of 
factors:  the  inefficiency  of  credit  ceilings,  as  margins  not  used  by 
one  bank  could  not  be  used  by  other  banks;  the State  Bank  and,  in turn, 
commercial  banks  built  significant  safety  margins  into  their  ceilings; 
moreover,  the  banks  were  reluctant  to  lend  in  the  highly  uncertain 
environment,  in  view  of  the  changing  prospects  facing  enterprises  and 
the  banks'  own  inexperience  in  credit  risk  assessment.  Czechoslovak 
commercial  banks  began  to  restrict  new  credit  to  state-owned 
enterprises  and  insisted  on  repayment  of  large  portions  of  outstanding 
debt  ahead  of  schedule.  Unable  to  obtain  bank  loans,  many  enterprises 
resorted  to  supplier's  credit,  so  causing  an  expansion  of  inter-
enterprise credit,  which  complicated  the task of  monetary  policy. 
The  announced  strengthening  of  the  bankruptcy  laws  may  precipitate  a 
wave  of  closures  throughout  the  economy.  But  as  the  flow  of  financial 
resources  to  non-viable  state  monopolies  is  curtailed,  credit  to  the 
emerging  private  business  sector  and  joint  ventures  with  foreign 
investors  should  rise.  While  the  tight  stance  of  credit  policy, 
especially  in  early  1991,  helped  avoid  the  onset  of  an  inflationary 
spiral  and  of  pressures  in  foreign  exchange  markets,  it may  have  added 
to the weakness  of  aggregate  demand  and  the contraction  in  output. 
3.6 External  aspects 
A  number  of  factors  have  affected  the  trade  flows  between  the  CSFR  and 
its  main  trade  partners  in  1991:  the  switch  to  convertible  currency 
trade  at  world  market  prices  among  the  CMEA  countries,  economic 
recession  in  the  CSFR  itself  and  in  its  eastern  neighbours,  and  a 
redirection  of  trade  towards  developed  market  economies,  in  particular 
the Community  market. 
In  1991  the  value  of  exports  declined  by  6%,  while  imports  fell  by  a 
more  substantial  22%.  Trade  growth  with  Western  Europe  was  not  strong 
enough  to  compensate  fully  for  the  collapse  of  CMEA  trade.  Exports  to 
developed  countries  actually  increased  by  14%  in  1991.  Much  of  this 
increase  stemmed  from  the  good  performance  in  the  EC  market:  in  1991 
the  Community  a~counted  for  some  41%  of  CSFR's  total  exports  compared 
with  24%  in  1988.  By  contrast,  in  1991  exports  to  the  former  CMEA  bloc 
dropped  by  about  a  quarter.  The  collapse  of  exports  to  the  former - 24  -
Soviet  Union  in  particular  has  deepened  the  domestic  recession, 
especially  in  Slovakia,  with  its  heavy  concentration  of  arms  factories 
and  other production geared  mostly  to the  former  Soviet  market. 
Lower  imports  reflected both the  recession,  and  the  shift  away  from  the 
energy-intensive,  polluting  industries.  As  to  the  origin  of  the  CSFR's 
imports  in  1991,  a  third  came  from  the  Community,  another  third  from 
the  former  CMEA  countries,  and  the rest of  the  world  supplied the rest. 
With  imports  dropping  faster  than  exports,  the  CSFR' s  trade  balance 
recorded  a  crown  25  billion  surplus  in  1991.  This  led  to  a  switch  in 
the  current  account  balance  from  deficit  to  surplus:  at  the  end  of 
1991,  the convertible-currency current  account  surplus  exceeded  US$  300 
million,  instead  of  the  US$  2.5  billion deficit  originally  projected. 
Such  a  surplus  has  the . effect  of  reducing  the  need  for  foreign 
borrowing,  making  easier  the  management  of  foreign  debt.  At  the  end  of 
1991  the  Central  Bank's  convertible-currency  reserves  amounted  to  US$ 
1.4 billion. 
As  part  of  the  reform  process,  foreign  trade  has  been  substantially 
liberalised.  As  a  result,  the  number  of  firms  or  individuals  involved 
in  foreign  trade  has  boomed.  As  of  January  1992,  the  import  surcharge 
was  reduced  from  15't  to  lO't,  while  at  the  same  time  customs  tariffs 
were  restructured,  with  the  average  tariff  increasing  by  20%.  At 
present  after  tax  hard-currency  profits,  or  a  foreign  investor'o 
capital  share  in  the  case  of  divestment  or  liquidation,  can  be 
repatriated. 
Czechoslovakia's  gross  external  debt  is  currently  just  over  US$  9 
billion,  ~f which  US$  4.6 billion is owed  to  commercial  banks.  Assuming 
that the  economic  reforms  stay  on  track,  the  CSFR  should  have  no  major 
difficulty  in  borrowing  in  the  international  markets.  In  1991, 
Czechoslovakia  received  US$  1.8  billion  credits  (under  various  forms) 
from  the  IMF,  and  the  World  Bank  pledged  a  US$  450  million  loan.  In 
January  1992  the  IMF  approved  a  drawing  by  the  CSFR  under  the 
Compensatory  and  Contingency  Financing  Facility  (CCFF)  equivalent  to 
about  US$  147  million  to  counter  soaring  oil  import  costs,  whereas  in 
April  1992  it granted  an  annual  stand-by  credit  of  US$  322  million  in 
support  of  the  Government's  economic  and  financial  programme;  in  June 
the  World  Bank  approved  a  US$  246  million  loan  to  modernize  existing 
power-generating  facilities  and to aid  in pollution control.  Apart  from 
the  various  types  of  credits  from  both  the  IMF  and  the  World  Bank, 
Czechoslovakia  han  been  able  to  raine  commercial  loans  and  issue 
government-backed  bonds  in the  international capital markets. 
In  addition  to  foreign  borrowing,  the  CSFR's  finances  benefited  from 
inflows  of  foreign  exchange  from  direct  foreign  investment,  which  in 
1991  totalled  about  US$  600  million.  In  the  light  of  the  growing 
interest  in  the  area  and  the  favourable  investment  laws,  the  role  of 
foreign  investors  in  the  CSFR's  economy  is  expected  to  grow  in  coming 
years. 
4.  Review of the performance criteria attached to the  EC  loan 
The  memorandum  of  understanding  between  the  community  and  the  CSFR, 
agreed  after  consultation  of  the  Monetary  Committee,  provided  for  a 
regular  evaluation  of  progress  made  with  respect  to  stabilization - 25  -
policies  and  structural adjustment  policies.  The  quantified  performance 
criteria  were  identical  to  those  contained  in  the  IMF  stand-by 
arrangement  and  included  the  following  elements:  quarterly  limitr:  on 
overall  credit  and  on  credit  to  the  government,  quarterly  minima  for 
international  reserves,  and  limits  on  the  contracting  of  new  external 
debt  by  the  public  sector. 
The  structural  adjustment  criteria  were  designed  to  evaluate  progress 
made  in  the  field  of  price  liberalisation,  the  privatization  of 
enterprioes  and  the  continuing  effort  to  mobilise  private  funding  of 
overall  financial  needs.  The  successful  review  of  progress  in  economic 
stabilization  and  reform,  including  the  observance  of  performance 
criteria,  was  a  condition  to  the  release  of  the  second  tranche  of  the 
loan. 
The  review  of  IMF  conditionality,  completed  in  two  reviews  in  June  and 
November  1991,  concluded  that  the  quantitative  performance  criteria 
were  met  and  the  reform  programme  was  considered  as  being  on  track,  so 
that  no  adjustments  to  the  programme  were  required.  The  structural 
performance  criteria  were  also  largely  met.  Total  turnover  based  on 
free  prices  was  eotimated  at  94-95'1.,  compared  to  the  original  92't 
target.  Trade  liberalization  was  well  advanced:  the  list  of  products 
subject  to  export  licensing  was  reduced,  and  further  reduction  are 
expected  in  the  near  future;  the  import  surcharge  was  reduced  from  20 
to  10%,  and  is expected to expire at  the  end  of  1992.  The  programme  for 
the  privatisation  of  large  ocale  enterprioeo  was  also  well  advanced. 
The  State  Bank  was  able  to  raise  a  significant  amount  of  financial 
resources  in  the  international  capital  markets.  A  bankruptcy  law 
entered  into  force  in October  1991,  while  laws  for  the  establishment of 
a  stock exchange,  and  the  functioning of the  banking  system,  investment 
companies  and  mutual  funds  were  submitted  to  the  Parliament.  The 
authorities  continued  to  permit  the  free  repatriation  of  profits  and 
the  proceeds  of  liquidation  of  investment  made  by  nonresidents  in 
Czechoslovakia,  while  bilateral  investment  protection  agreements  were 
signed with  ten  EC  Member  States. 
With  all  criteria  attached  to  the  Community  loan  broadly  met,  the 
second  tranche of  the medium-term  loan  was  disbursed  in  February  1992. 
5.  Developments  in 1992  and  ohort-term outlook 
In  mid-1992,  there  is  some  evidence  that  the  economic  decline  is  about 
to  taper  off,  with  production  in  traditional  sectors  stabilizing  and 
output  and  employment  growth  in  new  sectors gaining  momentum.  Inflation 
seems  now  to  be  under  control,  public  finances  show  no  alarming 
developments,  interest  rates  have  come  down  somewhat,  and  the  exchange 
rate  remains  stable.  Furthermore,  the  trade  balance  is  in  surplus  and 
the gross  hard-currency  debt  is  no  longer rising. 
In  the  first  quarter  of  1992  there  was  a  significant  recovery  in 
Czechoslovakia • s  trade.  Exports  increased  by  13%  and  imports  by  8% 
compared  to  the  same  period  in  1991.  The  re-direction  of  trade  away 
from  the  former  CMEA  bloc  continued,  and  it now  accounts  for  less  than 
one  fifth  of  total  CSFR  exports.  The  economic  authorities  intend  to 
maintain  a  fixed  exchange  rate  for  the  crown,  so  as  to  constrain 
domestic  prices  and  wages  within  reasonable  bounds. - 26  -
However,  major  structural  adjustment  is  still  to  come,  and  will 
probably  have  significant  negative  repercussions  on  the  labour  market 
and  for  enterprises'  balance  sheets.  Although  registered  unemployment 
rates  edged  down  in  early  1992  (partly  as  a  result  of  changed 
registration methods),  large-scale  labour  shedding  seems  unavoidable  to 
improve  the  competitivenens  and  profitability  of  enterprises  as  the 
alternative  {a  further  significant  decline  in  real  wages)  is 
politically  not  feasible.  Major  {budgetary)  risks  arc  also  hidden  in 
the  enterprises'  accounts,  as  liabilities  arc  accumulating  and  debt 
servicing  may  endanger  the  necessary  modernization  of  the  capital 
stock. 
Although  the  CSFR  has  been  able  to meet  part  of  its  financial  needs  in 
the  international  financial  markets,  in  the past  few  months  the  CSFR's 
authorities  have  expressed  concern  about  the  recent  rise  of  interest 
rates  on  commercial  credits,  well  above  their  traditional  levels.  In 
fact,  the  high  cost  of  borrowing  has  discouraged  them  from  oeeking 
larger  loans. 
The  economic  success  story  of  Czechoslovak  reforms,  resulting  from 
favourable  macroeconomic  starting  conditions,  comprehensive  and  rapid 
economic  policy  reform  and  good  macroeconomic  demand  management  in 
however  increasingly  overshadowed  by  political  developments.  Since 
1990,  growing  tensions  botween  the  Czech  republic  and  Slovakia  have 
slowed  down  the  reform  process.  Since  early  1992  reform-related 
legislation  has  come  to  a  ntandstill  and  is  unlikely  to  resume  before 
the future of the  Czech  and  Slovak Federal  Republic  io  settled. - 27  -
IV.  BULGARIA 
1.  Introduction 
At  the  end  of  1989,  after the  removal  from  power  of  Todor  Zhivkov,  the 
reform  process  in  Bulgaria,  which  had  started  timidly  in  1986-1987, 
accelerated.  However,  not  until  the  end  of  1990  did  it  move  into  an 
operational  phase. 
By  that  time,  the  economic  situation  worsened  considerably.  Real  GOP 
fell  by  some  11%  in  1990  (following  a  decline  already  in  1989); 
inflationary pressures,  which  had  been  building  up  in  the  economy  over 
several  years,  began  to manifest  themselves  in  acute  shortages  of  food 
and  basic  consumer  goods  and  price  increases  (open  inflation  exceeded 
64%  in  1990,  up  from  10%  in  1989).  The  extremely  precarious  financial 
situation  of  the  country  (at  the  end  of  1990,  external  reserves  were 
down  to  US$  125  million,  or  just  one  week  of  imports),  resulting  in 
part  from  the  discontinuation  of  private  financing  which  followed  the 
moratorium  on  foreign  debt  servicing1),  left  little  room  for 
manoeuvre.  It  was  clear  that  fundamental  changes  could  not  be  delayed 
any  longer. 
In  December,  an  independent  Prime  Minister  was  appointed;  in  early 
January  1991,  a  transitional  coalition  government  was  formed.  This 
government  was  given  a  mandate  to  speed  up  the  reform  process  and  to 
conclude  an  agreement  with  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (Bulgaria 
joined  the  IMF  in  September  1990).  It was  also  mandated  to  set  a  date 
for  new  local  and  parliamentary elections. 
The  government • s  economic  programme  adopted  in  the  beginning  of  1991 
was  seeking to address the  needs  for  economic stabilization and  a  rapid 
transition  to  a  market  economy.  The  three  main  objectives  of  the 
programme  (stabilize  the  economy  by  curtailing  excess  demand,  restore 
external  balances  and  credibility,  and  introduce  market  mechanisms 
through  necessary  structural  adjustments)  were  to  be  achieved  by  the 
implementation  of  a  comprehensive  set  of  liberalization,  stabilization 
and  structural  policies.  The  domestic  reforms  were  to  be  supported  by 
the  exchange  system  and  trade  reform  leading  to  early  current  account 
convertibility with  a  floating  exchange  rate. 
1)  Although  Bulgaria  had  started  to  borrow  substantial  amounts  in  the 
West  already  in  the  1960s  - mainly  to  finance  imports  of  equipment 
goods  needed  to  fulfil  export  commitments  to  the  CMEA  - its  net 
external  debt  in  hard  currency  remained  moderate  until  the  end  of 
the  1970o.  The  debt  even  declined  during  the  first  half  of  the 
1980s,  as  the  country  made  a  deliberate  effort  to  curtail  imports 
and  re-exported  cheap  Soviet oil to the  world  market.  From  then  on, 
however,  gross  foreign  debt  increased  sharply,  from  US$  3.2  billion 
in  1985  to  US$  9. 2  billion  in  1989.  The  main  explanations  are 
increased  imports  of  consumer  goods,  in  an  attempt  to  offset 
inadequate  domestic  production,  and  credits  to  developing  countries 
(such  as Libya  and  Iraq)  to which  substantial machinery  exports were 
made  but  not  paid  for.  By  early 1990,  in  a  context of  rapid economic 
disintegration  both  inside  the  country  and  within  the  CMEA  as  a 
whole,  the debt  burden  became  unbearable.  The  high  level of debt  and 
the  bunching  of  repayment  obligations  forced  the  country  to  declare 
a  unilateral moratorium  in 1990,  first on principal  repayments  and  a 
few  months  later on all debt  servicing. - 28  -
The  reform  was  to  be  implemented  in  an  extremely  difficult  external 
environment.  Bulgaria  was  practically  excluded  from  international 
capital  markets  and  had  to  face  the  collapse  of  CMEA  trade,  on  which 
Bulgaria  was  more  heavily  dependent  than  any  other  country  (in  1990, 
the  USSR  alone still absorbed  57~ of total Bulgarian exports,  or  19~ of 
GOP).  Moreover,  Bulgaria tended to pay  prices below world market  levels 
for  its  energy  and  raw  material  imports  from  the  USSR,  while  its 
exports  of  manufactured  goods  to  the  Soviet  Union  were  overpriced  by 
international  standards.  The  collapse  of  Soviet  import  demand,  and  the 
transition to world market  prices  for  remaining transactions,  implied  a 
double  adverse  shock,  probably  of  more  than  a  quarter  of  GOP  for  the 
1989-1991  period.  To  thio  should  be  added  the  loss  which  Bulgaria 
incurred  from  the  international  embargoes  against  Iraq  and  Libya 
(outstanding  but  non-performing  claims  on  Iraq,  for  instance,  arc  well 
in excess of  US$  1  billion). 
The  total  financing  needs  of  the  Bulgarian  economy  for  1991  consistent 
with  the  stabilization  targets  were  estimated  to  be  close  to  US$  3.8 
billion.  This  amount  included the  financing of current expenditure,  the 
repayment  obligations  on  the  foreign  debt,  the  settlement·  of  arrearo 
and  the  build-up  of  a  minimum  level  of  international  reserves.  The 
financing  of  the  programme  was  to  be  assured  exclusively  through  debt 
rescheduling  and  deferral  as  well  ao  through  new  official credits.  The 
debt  relief was  assumed  to  provide  US$  2.2  billion;  approximately  half 
of  the  remaining  US$  1.6 billion was  to be  covered by the Bretton Woods 
institutions.  The  IMF  was  to  conclude  with  Bulgaria  a  SDR  279  million 
(some  US$  390  million)  twelve-month  stand-by  arrangement  with  an 
attached  contingency  mechanism  for  oil  and  gao  prices;  additional 
resources  could  be  drawn  under  the oil clement  of  the  Compensatory  and 
Contingency  Financing  Facility.  The  World  Bank  was  to make  available  a 
Structural  Adjustment  Loan  of  US$  250  million.  To  close  the  residual 
financing  gap of approximately  US$  0.8 billion,  Bulgaria made  a  request 
to  the  Community  and  the  Group  of  twenty-four  for  complementary 
balance-of-payments assistance. 
The  Community  assistance to Bulgaria  of  ecu  290  million  (approximately 
US$  400  million,  or  half  the  estimated  financing  gap)  was  decided  in 
June  1991.  It was  made  available  in  two  trancheo  (of  respectively  ecu 
150  and  140 million).  The  disbursement of each  tranche was  oubject to a 
number  of  conditions  some  of  which  were  specific  to  Bulgaria.  In 
particular,  the  government' o  programme  was  to  be  implemented  in  the 
context  of  the  negotiations  with  public  and  private  creditoro  on  the 
country's  foreign  debt.  The  need  to  achieve  substantial  progreso  in 
these  negotiations  was  reflected  in  the  conditions  attached  to  the 
loan. 
The  first tranche  was  made  conditional,  in  addition  to  a  conclusion of 
a  stand-by arrangement  with the  IMF,  upon  a  debt  rescheduling  agreement 
with  the  Paris  Club  and  a  deferral  of  debt  servicing  payments  to 
commercial  banks  together  with  progreso  towards  the  conclusion  of  a 
long-term  debt  restructuring  agreement.  A  debt  rescheduling  agreement 
with  the  Pario  Club  was  reached  in  April.  The  debt  reotructuring 
negotiationo  with  the  commercial  banks  were  less  conclusive  but  the 
asourances  received  in June  from  both the  Bulgarian authorities  and  the 
commercial  banks'  advisory  committee that the parties were  committed  to 
make  oubstantial  progreos  towards  such  an  agreement  before  the  end  of 
1991  were  strong  enough  to  allow  for  the  release  of  the  first  tranche 
of  the  loan  which  took  place  in  Auguot  1991.  The  oecond  tranche  was 
conditional  upon  the  fulfilment  of  standard  economic  conditions - 29  -
attached  to  the  Community  loano  and  a  positive  asnesnment  of  progress 
made  with  respect to achieving  a  long-term debt  ~estructuring agreement 
with  the  private  creditor::;.  The  Commission' o  decision  to  disburse  the 
loan  took  place  in  March  1992  after  consultation  of  the  Monetary 
Committee  and  was  based  on  indicationo  of  progrecs  towards  such  an 
agreement  provided  by  both  side::;. 
The  pledgee  provided  by  the other member  countriec of  the G-24  amounted 
only  to  some  US$  214  million thuo  leaving the  assistance  package  ohort 
by  nearly  US$  200  million.  Almost  all  the  contributions  were  in  the 
form  of  untied  loans,  to  be  diobursed  in  one  or  two  tranches,  oubject 
to  compliance  with  conditions  attached  to  the  IMF  stand-by  arrangement 
or the World  Bank  SAL.  Only  a  small  contribution  from  the United  State::; 
was  effectively  diobursed .in  1991.  The  delays  in  the  disbursement  of 
the  other contributions  (by  the  EFTA  countries  and  Japan),  were  mainly 
due  to  procedural  conotraints  of  the  Bulgarian  administration  itself. 
In  addition  to  the  lower-than-requested  commitments  and  the  much 
longer-than-expected  delayo  in  mobilizing  the  G-24  aosistance,  delays 
have  also occurred  in the disbursement of the World  Bank  SAL:  the first 
tranche of the  loan  (US$  150 million)  was  only  put  in place in February 
1992. 
2.  Macroeconomic policies and performance in·l991 
2.1  stabilization programme  for  1991 
The  macro-economic  policy  developed  by  the authorities  was  designed  to 
create  conditions  for  a  reveroal  of  the  decline  of  the  economy 
(unavoidable  in  view  of  the  size  of  the  imbalances  to  be  corrected) 
already  before  the  end  of  1991.  overall,  the  programme  aimed  at 
limiting  the  fall  of  GOP  to  acme  11%  and  at  reducing  the  monthly 
inflation to  1-2%  by  the end  of the year,  after the  initial price  jump 
following  the comprehensive price reform in February. 
The  stabilization  policy  implemented  by  the  government  in  1991  was 
based  on  two  nominal  anchors:  a  tight  monetary  policy  which,  through 
credit  ceilings  impooed  on  the  banks  and  sharply  increased  interest 
rates,  controlled  broad  money  growth;  a  tight  tax-based  incomes 
policy,  which  foresaw  a  steep  decline  in  real  wages,  negotiated  with 
the  trade  unions.  In  addition,  fiscal  policy  was  aimed  at 
simultaneouoly  reducing the share of public  spending  in GOP  and  cutting 
the  budget  deficit.  Weak  international  reserves  and  uncertainties  in 
the external  financing  did not  allow  a  fixed  exchange  rate system to be 
introduced and maintained with credibility. 
The  economic  results  during  the  first  year  of  reform  have  been 
substantially  worse  than  anticipated.  Real  GOP  fell  by  22.9%  although 
this  figure  probably  overestimates  the  actual  decline  in  output  by 
taking  insufficiently  account  of  small  private-sector  activity,  in 
particular  in  retail  trade  and  services.  Retail  prices  jumped  by  277% 
during  the  first  quarter  reflecting  greater  than  anticipated 
depreciation  of  the  exchange  rate.  Prices  have  since then  continued to 
increase at  a  4-5%  monthly  rate,  or at an  annual  rate of  some  70%. 
The  stabilization  policieo  successfully  implemented  in  1991  have 
clearly  contributed  to  the  much  stronger  than  expected  recession. 
However,  by  far ~he most  important  reason for the contraction of output 
has  been the collapse of trade with the  CMEA  (and especially the  USSR). 
The  collapse  of  Bulgaria's traditional  foreign  markets  and  the  decline - 30  -
in  domestic  output  led  to  a  sharp  decrease  in  exports.  This  forced  a 
very  rigorous  contraction  of  imports,  which  in  turn  exacerbated  the 
domestic  contraction.  Thene  trends  were  further  aggravated  by  acute 
shortfalls  in  external  financing,  as  a  large  proportion  of  official 
assistance  co~~itted to Bulgaria was  not effectively paid out;  overall, 
of  US$  l.  6  billion  initially  expected  only  US$  0. 7  billion 
materialized. 
2.2  Output  and  demand 
The  decline  in  real  GOP  reflects  primarily  the  decline  in  industrial 
activity  (27. 5%);  output  in  agriculture  and  services  is  entimated  to 
have  dropped  by  respectively  13%  and  21%.  The  bulk  of  the  decline  in 
industrial  production  is  accounted  for  by  the  five  largest  industrial 
subsectors  most  dependent  on  trade  within  CHEA:  chemical  and 
petrochemical  industry,  electrical  and  electronical  engineering, 
ferrous  metallurgy,  machine  building  and  metal  processing  and  agro-
industry.  Host  of  the  decline  occurred  in  the  first  half  of  the  year; 
some  resumption  of  activity was  regintered  in the  last quarter  of  1991 
(with,  in particular,  a  cautious  recovery of the output of  some  export-
oriented  industrieo,  namely  machine  building  and  textileo),  but  it 
proved to be  temporary. 
The  decline  in  agricultural  production  reflects  both  domestic  and 
external  factoro.  Livestock declined  due  in particular to  shortageo  of 
imported  feed  grain  (thio  reoulted  in  a  temporary  increase  of  meat 
supply).  A  relatively  poor  performance  of  crop  production  (with  a 
notable exception of vegetables  subsector)  reflects  claw  implementation 
of  land  reform  and  an  unfavourable  purchase  price  ntructure  resulting 
from  a  still highly monopoliotic  food  processing  industry.  The  decline 
in  services  reflects  primarily  the  contraction  of  the  banking  sector 
and  transportation. 
On  the  demand  side,  investment  is estimated to have  been  reduced  by  two 
thirds  in  real  termo.  This  reflects  the  effects  of  domestic 
uncertainty,  restrictive  monetary  policy  and  shortfalls  of  external 
financing.  Consumption  declined  much  less  by  some  8%,  owing 
excluoively  to  the  decrease  in  public  consumption  (by  almost  half) 
while  on  the  other  hand,  private  consumption  seems  to  have  increased 
slightly,  despite  a  substantial  drop  in  real  wages.  Monthly  business 
surveys  suggest that  weakness  of domestic  (and  foreign)  demand,  and  no 
more  input  shortages,  became  by  mid-1991  the  predominant  factor  behind 
output decline. 
2.3  Wa~cs and  labour market 
Wages  and  the  labour market  have  largely  borne  the  cost  of  adjustment. 
Real  wages  fell  very  sharply  (by  42%,  compared  to  a  target  of  35%) 
during  1991.  The  drop  had  been  much  stronger in  the first months  of the 
year  when  restrictive  incomes  policy  had  prevented  real  wages  catching 
up  larger  than  expected  retail  price  rice.  Public  sector  labour 
shedding  has  been  very  substantial  at  around  900,000  jobs  (over  20%  of 
the  labour  force),  both  in  the  otate  adminiotration  and  in  the  state 
enterprise  sector.  Unemployment  rose  from  negligible  levels  at  the 
start of  1991  to  419,000  (10.2%  of  the  labour  force)  in  December  1991. 
The  difference  suggesto  that  there  hao  been  a  substantial  increase  in 
small  private-sector  activity,  although  statistical  problems  prevent  a 
precise assessment  of this effect. - 31  -
2.4  Fifical  policy 
In  the  fifical  area,  the  government's  objectives  were  only  partly 
achieved  in  1991.  On  the  expenditure  side,  fiUbsidies  were  slashed  from 
14.9%  of  GOP  in  1990  to  4.0't.  The  budget  was,  however,  caught  in  a 
"debt  trap":  the  full  cost  of  interefit  due  on  internal  and  external 
debt  amounted  to  17.5't  of  GOP  in  1991.  Only  by  not  servicing  external 
debtfi  could  the  cafih  deficit  be  limited  to  3. 7%  of  GOP  (against  a 
target  of  0.1%;  on  an  accrual  basis it was  14.9%).  A  real  effort  was 
made,  nonethelefis,  as  is  shown  by  the  primary  budget  balance  (which 
excludes  interest charges),  which  improved  from  -3.5%  of  GOP  in  1990  to 
+2. 7%  in  1991.  On  the  revenue  fiide,  the  budget  faced  unanticipated 
shortfalls,  mainly  in  the  first  half  of  1991  (following  the  weak 
activity);  this  led  in  particular  to  emergence  of  interest  and 
expenditure  arrears  (the  situation  improved  fiomewhat  later).  The 
financing  of  the  budget  deficit  was  mainly  asfiured  through  credit  from 
the  banking  syotem.  In  addition,  treaoury  billo  amounting  to  leva  0.8 
billion  were  isfiued  to  non-bankfi  (including  subscription  by  the  state 
insurance  company). 
2.5  Monetary  policy 
Monetary  policy  has  been  particularly restrictive  in  the  first  half  of 
1991  when  policy  reotraint  led  to  large  real  declines  in  monetary  and 
credit  flows.  In  the  second  half  of  the  year,  in  view  of  reduction  in 
inflation  and  signs  of  a  liquidity  crunch  in  the  real  economy,  credit 
policy  was  eased  to  support  an  anticipated  recovery.  Overall,  with  the 
exception  of  credit  to  general  government,  credit  and  monetary 
aggregates  remained  under  control  in  1991  and  nominal  monetary  targets 
were  met  (with  broad  money  to  GOP  ratio declining  from  111%  at the  end 
of  1990  to  75%  at the end of  1991). 
Interest  rates  were  substantially  increased  in  the  beginning  of  1991: 
the  basic  rate  of  the  National  Bank  was  adjusted  from  4. 5%  to  45%. 
Subsequently  1  it  was  raised  to  54%,  which  implied  effective  lending 
rates of  commercial  banks  ot  some  70%,  or real  rates  close  to  zero.  On 
the  other  hand,  real  deposit  rates  were  still  negative  owing  to  high 
intermediation  costs.  In  the  second  half  of  1991,  new  indirect 
instruments  of  monetary  control  were  introduced,  and  the  Lombard  rate 
has  de  facto  replaced  the  baoic  refinancing  rate  as  the  leading 
interest rate. 
2.6  External  developmento 
Foreign  trade  in  1991  was  reduced  dramatically  reflecting  weaker 
domestic  economy  and  the  collapse  of  Bulgaria' o  traditional  trading 
partners,  as  well  as  deteriorating  terms  of  trade  and  external 
financing  shortfalls.  Overall,  export  volumes  dropped  by  an  estimated 
40%  and  import  compression  was  even  larger  (47%).  The  decline  was 
substantially  more  pronounced  with  the  former  CMEA  ( 61%  and  67%  for 
exports  and  imports  respectively).  Trade  with  non-CMEA  countries 
declined much  less:  imports  were  down  by  27%,  and  exports  by  just 8.5%. 
overall  figures  hide  some  recovery registered with  the  non-CMEA  area  in 
the  second  half  of  the  year.  Along  with  the  decline  in  volumes,  a 
oignificant  structural  shift  in  the  trade  towards  industrialized 
economies  was  recorded  in  1991. - 32  -
Ao  for  transactions  in  hard  currencies,  export  volumes  in  1991 
decreased  by  about  35%  and  import  volumes  by  62%  thus  resulting  in  a 
balanced  trade,  although  at  very  low  levels.  Exports  and  imports 
amounted  to  US$  3.7-3.8  billion,  against  targeted  levels  of  US$  6.6 
billion  and  US$  8.0  billion  respectively.  Ao  a  result,  the  deficit  of 
the  current  account  for  1991  wac  limited  to  US$  0.9  billion.  The  much 
stronger  than  expected  import  compression  allowed  the  targets  in  terms 
of  build-up of  international  reserves  to  be  met:  these  were  increased 
at  the  end  of  1991  to  some  US$  0.7  billion  (or  close  to  two  months  of 
convertible currency  imports),  with official reserves  rising to  US$  0.4 
billion. 
3.  The  strategy  and  the  achievements  of  the  liberalization  and 
structural reform programme 
From  the  beginning  of  the  implementation  of  the  reform  programme,  the 
government  has  proceeded  with  extensive  liberalization measures  in  the 
fields  of  price  formation,  foreign  trade  and  exchange  regulations.  In 
addition,  the  programme  included  an  ambitious  set  of  structural 
reforms:  social  protection,  specification  of  an  energy  policy, 
financial  sector  reform,  enterprise  restructuring  and  privatization, 
agrarian reform. 
These  have  proceeded  more  slowly  than  planned  in  1991.  After  the  first 
batch  of  measures  adopted  during  the  first  half  of  the  year,  the 
absence  of  a  broad  political  agreement  within  the  government,  and  the 
prospect  of  presidential  and  parliamentary  elections  in  October  1991 
and  January  1992,  caused  a  prolonged  pause  in  the  reform  process  from 
the  summer  onwards;  only  in  late  1991  and  early  1992,  under  a  new 
government  excluding the ex-communists,  did the process start again. 
3.1  Liberalization 
The  price  liberalization was  successfully  implemented  in  the  beginning 
of  the  year.  Most  prices  were  freed  at  one  stroke,  in  order  to 
eliminate the  increasingly pervasive shortages  and  the very substantial 
overhang  of  unwanted  savings.  However,  prices  for  four  energy  products 
and  public  utilities  were  administratively  set  (but  periodically 
increased  to  limit  the  budgetary  coot  of  subsidies),  and  those  of  14 
categories  of  goodn  remained  subject  to  a  npecial  monitoring  syntem. 
Overall,  entirely free  and monitored retail prices are  now  estimated to 
represent  nome  90%  of total retail turnover. 
The  foccign  trade  regime  was  also significantly liberalized,  non-tariff 
barriers  being  removed  except  for  a  limited  list  of  products  which 
remained  nubject  to  export  bans.  In  July,  export  rentr  ict  ions  were 
furth~r reduced. 
A  new  exchange  rate  nyntem  wan  put  in  place  in  February,  providing  for 
a  single  exchange  rate  which  wan  left  to  float  on  the  inter-bank 
market.  Following  the  initial  overnhooting,  the  exchange  rate 
stabilized  at  come  15  leva  per  dollar.  Suboequently,  the  Bulgarian 
currency  gradually depreciated to  a  rate of  20-23  leva  par dollar.  The 
nominal  exchange  rate wan  significantly more  depreciated than  envisaged 
in  the  beginning  of  1991  (7-10  leva),  reflecting  weaknesnes  of  the 
economy  and  a  still  low  level  of  credibility  of  the  reforms,  at  least 
regarding  the external policies.  The  unification of  the  exchange  regime 
was  accompanied  by  the  removal  of  restrictions  on  most  current-account 
transactions,  including invisible payments  and  transfers.  Although this - 33  -
was  never  officially  declared,  the  lev 
intents  and  purposes  for  current-account 
residents. 
became  convertible  to  all 
commercial  transactions  by 
3.2  Enterprise restructuring and  privatization 
A  start  was  made  with  the  demonopolization  of  large  firms  and  their 
transformation  into  commercial  companies.  A  land  act  was  adopted  which 
aimed  at  a  restitution  of  agricultural  land  to  individual  farmers.  It 
was  however  so  hemmed  in  with  restrictions  that  it  remained 
inoperational.  Large  sections  of  a  commercial  code  were  adopted. 
Nevertheless,  existing  bankruptcy  and  liquidation  procedures  have  not 
been  enforced  (a  separate  bankruptcy  law  does  not  exist  yet) ,  and 
budget  constraints  on  enterprises  remained  too  soft  in  practice.  Small 
privatization  began  but  was  suspended  in  mid-year  as  legislative 
authority  lapsed. 
In  the  financial  sphere,  progreos  was  made  with  the  restructuring  of 
the  banking  system  and  the  enactment  of  modern  banking  legislation.  A 
large  proportion  of  bank  aosets  consisto  however  of  bad  loans  to 
enterprises.  This  has  a  number  of  pernicious  effects.  It  limits 
severely the banks'  scope to  finance the emerging private sector,  since 
most  of their resources  are absorbed  by  the  forced  rolling over of  non-
performing  loans to large state enterprises.  It also prevento the banks 
from  initiating enterprise bankruptcies  (since writing off  bad  loans  is 
impossible  in  view  of  the  banks'  own  weak  asset  structure),  thus 
hindering  the  proceso  of  reotructuring  of  the  enterprioe  sector.  The 
government  has  started  a  proceos  of  gradual  recapitalization  of  the 
banks,  by  replacing  bad  debto  with  government  hondo,  but  thio  io 
hampered  by  its budgetary cost. 
4.  Review of performance criteria attached to the EC  loan 
The  Memorandum  of  Understanding  oigned  by  the  EC  Commission  and  the 
Bulgarian  authorities  after  conoultation  of  the  Monetary  Committee, 
set  up  the  quantified  performance  criteria  and  the  structural 
adjustment  criteria  attached  to  the  Community  loan.  The  quantified 
criteria  were  identical  to  those  in  the  stand-by  arrangement  with  the 
IMF.  They  included quarterly limits on  net credit of the banking  syotem 
to  the  general  government  and  to the  economy  overall,  quarterly  floors 
for  the  increase  of  the  international  reserveo  of  the  National  Bank, 
limits  on  contracting  or  guaranteeing  medium- and  long-term  external 
debt  ao  well  as  on  the  stock of  short-term debt  of  the  public  sector. 
The  structural  adjustment  criteria were  designed  to  evaluate  progress 
made  by  Bulgaria  with  respect  to  the  implementation  of  structural 
policies,  with particular emphasis  on  the liberalization of prices,  the 
reduction  of  trade  and  exchange  restrictions,  the  eotablishment  of  a 
legal  framework  for  private  property  rights  and  the  privatization  of 
enterprises.  The  successful  review  of  progress  in  economic 
stabilization  and  reform,  including  the  observance  of  performance 
criteria,  was  a  condition  to  the  release  of  the  second  tranche  of  the 
loan. 
The  review of conditionality took place  in December  1991  (by  which  time 
the  IMF  had  completed  three  reviews  of  the  economic  developments  and 
policies,  and of the financing of the programme).  It was  concluded that 
the  quantitative performance  criteria were  either met  or waived  by  the 
IMF,  and  that  the  structural  performance  criteria  were  broadly  met 
(despite delayo  with regard to privatization). - 34  -
Price liberalization han  been  almost  completed,  with the only exception 
of  nome  energy  items  still  subject  to  controls.  A  law  on  competition 
han  been  adopted  which  established  a  legislative  framework  to  promote 
competition  and  to  control  abuses  in  the  field  of  monopolistic  price 
netting.  With  regard to  foreign  trade  regime,  quantitative restrictions 
on  exports  has  been  reduced.  Free  repatriation  of  profits  and  of  the 
proceeds  of  liquidation of  investment  made  by  non-residents are  legally 
permitted  within  the  framework  of  the  foreign  investment  law; 
investment  protection  agreement  negotiations  have  advanced  with  a 
number  of  EC  countries.  The  exchange  system  reform  han  been  broadened 
with  further  restrictions  on  invisible  payments  and  transfers  being 
removed.  Considerable  progress  han  been  achieved  in  enterprise 
demonopolization  and  restructuring.  The  legislative  framework  for  the 
privatization  is  being  completed  and  amended  versions  of  several  laws 
adopted  in  the  beginning  of  1991  are  being  prepared  in  order  to  speed 
up  the  implementation  of  the  privatization  process  and  improve  its 
efficiency. 
5.  Developments  in 1992 
There  has  been  little  significant  change  in  the  trend  of  economic 
developments  during  the  first months  of  1992.  Although  the  statistical 
basin  is  too  weak  to  ascertain  thin  with  any  precision,  the  output 
decline  continued  but  is  likely  to  have  slowed  down.  Unemployment 
continued  to  increase;  it stood  at  12.5%  in  May.  The  underlying  trend 
of  inflation  remained  at  4-5%  per month;  it was  substantially stronger 
in  May  (12%),  reflecting  further  increases  in  utility  prices. 
Inflationary  expectations  remain  high,  and  it  is  likely  that  the 
official  target  of  a  2%  monthly  rate  by  end-1992  will  not  be  met. 
Exports  to  the  West  appear  to  have  recovered  during  the  first  quarter, 
but trade with  the ex-Soviet states has  collapsed  further. 
No  significant  improvement  in  these  trends  can  be  expected  unless 
structural  reform  gets  under  way.  In  this  area,  the  most  recent 
developments  are  encouraging.  The  first  months  of  1992  have  seen  the 
adoption of  a  number  of  major  pieces of  legislation which  open  the  way 
for the start of effective implementation. 
Between  December  1991  and  February  1992  laws  were  passed  allowing  the 
restitution  of  shops  and  small  businesses  to  former  owners,  and 
implementation  has  begun.  Especially  in  the  cities,  this  has  already 
led  to  the  emergence  of  a  new,  dynamic  oector  of  small  retail  and 
service  enterprises.  For  large  industrial  enterprises,  a  privatization 
law  was  adopted  in  April  after  considerable  political  controversy.  It 
does  not  provide  for  free  diotribution  of  shares,  although  employees 
will  get  preferential  terms.  Privatization  of  agricultural  land  has 
proved  equally  difficult  politically;  the  1991  land  act  was  finally 
revised  in  April  1992,  which  ohould  ease  the  process.  In  1992, 
agricultural  output  will  still  decline  as  a  result  of  uncertainties 
over  land  title,  but  a  pooitive  supply  response  may  be  hoped  for  in 
1993.  In  January  1992,  a  new  and  more  liberal  foreign  investment  law 
was  passed  (replacing the one  adopted  in mid-1991). 
The  foreign  trade  regime  was  further  restructured  in  July  1992:  the 
tariff  schedule  was  simplified  (import  duties  now  range  between  5  and 
40%,  against  0  to  150%  previously);  the  15%  import  surcharge  was 
abolished  and  export  restrictions have  been  reduced. - 35  -
Negotiations  with  Bulgaria's  commercial  bank  creditors,  which  had  been 
stalled  for  a  long  time,  have  resumed;  in  April,  the  government 
proposed  a  comprehensive,  one-off  debt  and  debt  service  reduction 
scheme  of  the  Brady  type.  At  present,  the  talks  on  the  proposal 
including  straightforward  debt  forgiveness,  interest  reduction,  debt 
buybacks  and  debt-equity  swaps  arc  continuing.  A  rapid  and  successful 
conclusion  of  these  negotiations,  and  the  lifting  of  Bulgaria's 
complete  financial  isolation  would  be  a  major  step  forward  on  the  road 
to  recovery. 
In  March  1992,  Dulgaria  addressed  to  the  Commission  a  request  for 
complementary  Community  and  G-24  balance  of  payments  assistance  for 
1992  worth  USS  240  million.  The  assistance  is  being  requested  to 
support  the  government's  economic  programme  for  1992  backed  by  a  new 
twelve-month  stand-by  arrangement  approved  by  the  IMF  in  April  under 
which  Bulgaria will  be  able to purchase  up to SDR  155 million  (some  US$ 
218  million).  The  Community  is  currently  considering  providing  a  two-
tranche medium-term  loan of  ecu  110  million. 
The  Bulgarian  authorities  are  placing  the  1992  programme  in  a  longer-
term  perspective.  The  government's  medium-term  objectives  include 
progress  towards  a  viable  balance  of  payments,  the  resumption  of 
private capital  flows,  the setting of  a  domestic  financial  framework  to 
secure  low  inflation  and  provide  for  increasing  financing  of  the  non-
government  sector,  and  finally  the  continuation  of  the  structural 
reform.  The  authorities are  in the process of elaborating  a  medium-term 
programme  which  they  expect  to  finalize  during  1992.  On  the  basis  of 
such  a  programme  Bulgaria  has  requested  an  extended  arrangement  with 
the  IMF. 
6.  Assessment  and  prospccto 
The  Community  assistance to  Bulgaria  has  been  instrumental  in  ensuring 
substantial  success  in  the  country's  efforts  to  stabilize  and  reform 
its  economy.  The  move  away  from  central  planning  and  towards  market 
democracy  appears  to  be  irreversible  and  a  number  of  positive  results 
have  been  achieved  during  1991  and  early  1992.  Shortages  have  been 
eliminated  and  prices  now  clear  markets,  even  if at  levels  which  many 
can  ill afford.  The  price  shock  following  liberalization  has  absorbed 
the  substantial  monetary  overhang  and  hyperinflation  has  been  avoided, 
although  the  danger  has  not  been  entirely  averted.  Much  of  the 
legislative  and  institutional  framework  of  a  modern  market  economy  is 
now  in  place  and  social  peace  has  been  maintained,  even  if  the 
political  consensus  has  at  times  been  less  than  optimal.  Finally,  the 
external  financial  situation  of  the  country  has  also  improved; 
international  reserves  have  increased substantially and  current  account 
convertibility is basically achieved. 
Yet  the  most  difficult  part  of  the  transition  process  is still  ahead. 
Domestically,  the  scope  for  structural  reform  created  by  the  new 
legislative  framework  will  need  to  be  effectively  used.  Rapid  and 
effective  implementation  of  the  measures  decided  upon  in  principle  now 
appears  to  be  the  major  challenge  facing  the  Bulgarian  authorities. 
Only  thus will  a  supply  response  from  the emerging  private sector be  of 
sufficient  magnitude  to  offset  the  inevitable  losses  from  a 
restructuring  of  the  state  sector.  Failure  in  this  respect  will 
undoubtedly  lead  to  a  further  protracted  phase  of  output  decline,  and - 36  -
will  increase  the  risk  of  hyperinflation  considerably.  This  in  turn 
would  undermine  public  support  for  reform  and  endanger  social 
cohesion. 
Macroeconomic  stability  is  very  fragile.  A  resumption  of  growth  will 
need  to  be  export-led,  since  there  is  no  room  for  domestic  fiscal  or 
monetary  stimuli.  This  requires  that  market  access  for  Bulgarian 
exports,  especially  in  Wentern  Europe,  be  adequate.  In  thin  respect, 
the  ansociation  agreement  between  the  Community  and  Bulgaria  currently 
being negotiated could play  an  important role. 
Large-scale  foreign  assistance 
necessary  for  nome  time  to  come 
debt  reduction  package  will  be 
realistic to count  on  nufficient 
.in the  next  few  years. 
from  official  sources  will  remain 
since,  even  assuming  that  a  generous 
agreed  with  the  banks,  it  io  not 
spontaneous  inflows  of private capital - 37  -
V.  ROMANIA 
1.  Introduction 
After  a  long  period  of  political turmoil  following  the  collapse  of  the 
Ceauscescu  regime  in  December  1989,  the  Romanian  authorities  embarked 
in  1991  upon  a  comprehensive  reform  programme  aimed  at  stabilizing the 
economic  situation  and  initiating the  process  of  transformation  from  a 
highly  centralized  planned  system  to  a  market-oriented  economy. 
However,  the  starting  conditions  for  thin  procesn  were  unfavourable. 
The  previous  regime's  overriding  concern  of  repaying  the  foreign  debt 
through  a  policy  of  import  comprension  had  left  the  country  with  an 
obsolete  capital  stock  and  huge  pent-up  demand  for  consumer  goods.  As 
a  result,  major  imbalances  had  started to  appear  as  the  command  system 
was  abolished  and  resources  were  redirected  towards  meeting  the 
consumption  needs  of  the population. 
The  Romanian  government  began to introduce  a  number  of economic  reforms 
in late 1990.  In  November  1990,  a  partial price liberalization and  the 
adjustment  of  controlled prices  brought  prices of  most  imported  inputs 
broadly  in line with  world  market  prices at the current  exchange  rate. 
Furthermore,  a  separation  of  the  central  and  commercial  banking 
functions  of  the  National  Bank  of  Romania  constituted  a  first  step 
towards  the  creation  of  a  market-based  financial  system  while  at  the 
same  time  enhancing  the  authorities'  ability  to  enforce  monetary 
control. 
For  1991  the  government  deoigned  a  comprehensive  programme  aimed  at 
restructuring the  economy  while  eliminating or  reducing  major  economic 
imbalances.  The  programme's  stabilization objectives  for  1991  were  to 
contain  the  decline  in  output,  to  otabilize  the  price  level  and  to 
rebuild the  level of  foreign  reserves through tight fiscal  and  monetary 
policy,  wage  restraint  and  an  appropriate  exchange  rate  policy.  The 
structural  reforms  included  liberalization  of  foreign  trade,  price 
liberalization,  privatization  and  restructuring  of  state  enterprises, 
and  financial  sector reform. 
To  support  the  economic  reform  and  adjustment  programme,  the 
authorities requested  assistance  from  the  IMF  in the  form  of  a  stand-by 
arrangement  in an  amount  equivalent to SDR  380.5 million  (about  US$  518 
million),  as  well  as  drawingo  under  the  oil-import  element  of  the 
Compenoatory  and  Contingency Financing Facility of  SDR  209.4  (about  US$ 
285  million),  which  were  approved  by  the  Executive  Board  of  the  IMF  on 
11  April  1991  and  15  March  1991,  respectively. 
In  addition,  the  authorities  requested  complementary  financial 
asoistance  from  the  Community  and  the Group  of Twenty-Four to close the 
remaining  financing  gap,  which  was  estimated  at  some  US$  1  billion. 
First  indications  from  non-EC  G-24  members  regarding  their 
participation  in  the  overall  effort  to  assist  Romania  were  mixed.  In 
particular,  the  United  States  indicated  that  it would  not  participate 
because  of  doubtn  about  the  depth  and  permanence  of  the  political 
changes  that  had  taken place. 
In  the  circumst~nces,  the  European  Council  on  4  April  1991,  agreed  in 
principle to grant Romania  a  medium-term balance of  payments  loan  for  a 
maximum  amount  of  ecu  375  million  (equivalent  to  US$  500  million), - 38  -
provided  that  a  comparable  amount  was  committed  by  non-EC  G-24  and 
third  countr  iez,  and  that  the  izzue  of  the  depth  and  permanence  of 
Romania'z  political  reform  efforto  was  clarified.  The  loan  was  to  be 
disburoed  in  two  tranches,  the  firot  tranche  being  subject  to  approval 
of  the  agreement  by  the  IMF  Executive  Board,  the  oecond  (to  be 
disbursed  in the  fourth  quarter of  the year)  oubject to  compliance  with 
a  number  of  performance  criteria  set  out  in  the  Memorandum  of 
Understanding  agreed  between  the  Commisoion  and  Romania  after 
consultation of  the Monetary  Committee. 
The  shortfall  in  non-Community  pledges  resulted  in  considerable  delays 
in  the  finalization  and  in  the  disbursement  of  the  assistance.  The 
formal  decision  was  adopted  by  the  Council  on  22  July  1991  (Decision 
91/384/EEC)  more  than  two  months  after  the  European  Parliament 
delivered  a  favourable  opinion  on  16  May  1991.  The  conditione  for  the 
disbursement  of  the  first  tranche  of  ecu  190  million  were  in  place  in 
early  August,  when  the  need  for  matching  commitments  by  other  members 
of  the  G-24  was  met  (amounting to US$  227  million).  However,  a  lengthy 
budgetary  process  further  delayed  the  disbursement  of  the  first 
tranche.  Against  this  background,  a  bridging  loan  from  the  BIS, 
equivalent  to  the  first tranche  of  the  Community  loan,  wao  extended  in 
September  1991.  In  December  1991,  the Council  agreed  on  the release  in 
due  time  of  the  oecond  instalment  of  the  loan  deopite  insufficient 
commitment  from  non-Community  members  of  the  G-24.  Eventually,  the 
firot  tranche  wao  disbursed  at the  end  of  January  1992,  and,  following 
the  positive  assessment  in  early  1992  of  the  fulfilment  of  the 
conditions  attached  to  the  agreement,  the  diobursement  of  the  second 
instalment  (ecu  185  million)  was  effected  in  April  1992.  Ao  of  mid-
1992,  commitmento  by  other  members  of  the  G-24  in  support  of  the 
Romanian  programme  for  1991  amounted  to  US$  237  million  and 
disbursemento totalled US$  115  million. 
The  delayo  in  mobilizing  the  necesoary  external  financing  from  the 
Group  of  24  further  aggravated  the difficulties for  the  implementation 
of  the  adjustment  and  reform  programme  that  had  already  resulted  from 
an  external  environment  that  was  significantly  harsher  than  initially 
envioaged,  notably  in  regard  to  the  greater-than-expected  decline  in 
trade  with  the  ex-CMEA  countries,  especially  the  USSR.  In  the 
circumstances,  the  objectiveo  of  the  1991  programme  with  regard  to 
growth,  inflation and  international reserves  could  not  be  achieved. 
Despite  theoe  shortcomingo,  the  Romanian  authorities  did  implement  the 
programme  measureo,  including  price  and  trade  liberalization,  cautious 
financial  and  income  policies,  fiscal  and  financial  sector reforms  and 
liberalization  of  the  exchange  system.  In  addition,  the  authorities 
introduced  a  series  of  important  structural  measures,  with  the  aim  of 
liberalizing  private  economic  activity,  privatizing  state  assets  and 
building  the  legal  and  institutional  framework  necessary  for  the 
efficient  functioning  of  a  market-based  economy.  Even  the  political 
unrest  in  September  only  slightly  delayed  the  unification  of  the 
official exchange rate,  until November  1991. 
The  present report describes the evolution of the economic  situation of 
Romania  in  1991  and  early  1992  with  particular  reference  to  the 
implementation  of  the  conditions  attached  to  the  loan,  including  the 
disbursement of the  second  tranche  in April  1992. - 39  -
2.  Macroeconomic  Devclopmento  and Performance in 1991 
The  authorities'  macroeconomic  adjustment  programme  for  1991  aimed  at 
limiting  the  fall  in  real  GDP,  stabilizing  the  price  level  after  the 
elimination  of  price  controls  and  moving  towards  a  viable  balance  of 
payments  situation,  including  an  adequate  build-up  of  external 
reserves.  The  authorities made  significant progress  in stabilizing the 
economy  during  most  of  the  year,  but  the  objectives  for  the whole  year 
could  not  be  achieved  -- particularly  with  regard  to  inflation  and 
international reserves -- because of the difficult external environment 
and  the  shortfall  in  external  financing,  and  because  of  the relaxation 
of the hitherto tight monetary policy at the end  of  the year. 
The  original  programme  . assumed  zero  real  GDP  growth.  However, 
continuing  external  problems  (including the  effects of  the  collapse  in 
CMEA  trade  and  the  shortfall  in  external  financing)  and  the effects of 
the disorganization of the economic  oystem  led to a  decline in GDP,  now 
estimated at  13  percent  in  1991. 
As  regards  inflation,  the  original  programme  targeted  the  end-of-year 
rate of  inflation at  15  per  cent  per  annum  (about  1  per  cent  a  month). 
However,  monthly  inflation accelerated to about  10  per cent  late in the 
year,  and  in  January  1992  reached  nearly  20  per  cent,  reflecting  the 
sharp  depreciation  following  the  unification  of  the  exchange  rate  and 
an  accommodating  credit policy. 
Exports  and  imports  were  significantly  less  than  originally projected. 
Exceptional  financing  from  the  Community  and  the  G-24  amounted  to only 
US$  250  million  compared  with  a  planned  US$  1  billion.  In  addition, 
other  capital  inflows  fell  short  of  planned  amounts.  The  decline  in 
reserves  of  the  banking  system  exceeded  US$  800  million  during  the 
year,  compared with  a  planned decline of  US$  600 million. 
2.1 Output  and  demand 
Real  GOP  fell  by  13%  in  1991,  following  a  7.5%  decline  in  1990.  The 
collapse  in  CMEA  trade,  the  disruption  of  economic  links  with  the 
Middle  East  because  of the Gulf  War,  the  oboolescent  capital  stock  and 
energy  shortages  contributed  to  a  20.6%  decrease  in  industrial 
production.  Production  fell  in  all  sub-sectors  of  industry,  with  the 
biggest  losses  recorded  in  energy-intensive  industries  (chemicals, 
metallurgy,  etc.). 
Agricultural  production  declined  by  0.6%  in  1991,  following  a  2% 
decline  in  the  previous  year.  Shortages  in  fuel,  equipment  and  spare 
parts have prevented subotantial  increases  in output  and productivity. 
Conoumption  declined  by  about  16%  in  1991  as  a  direct  consequence  of 
the erooion of average real  wages  (-4.2%).  Gross  fixed  investment fell 
by  almost  31%  in  real  terms,  as  a  renult  of  the  nharp  cutbacks  in 
public  sector  investment.  Investment  by  the  private  nectar  showed 
negligible growth  in 1991  to reach  4.5%  of total investment. 
2.2  Monetary  policy 
The  expansion of  domentic  credit  from  the banking  system wan  kept  under 
ntrict control  t.hrough  September  1991  (net domestic  asseto  increased by 
less than  20  per cent relative to end-1990  broad money).  However,  weak 
financial  discipline  led  to  a  rapid  build-up  of  inter-enterprise - 40  -
payments  arrears.  Starting  in  october  1991,  the  National  Bank  of 
Romania  began to allow  an  expansion of credit to enterprises to resolve 
the  problem  of  inter-enterprise  arrears,  and  in  December,  a  law  was 
enacted  by  Parliament,  referred  to  ac  "the  global  compensation", 
calling  for  an  additional  expansion  of  bank  credit  to  clear  these 
arrears.  The  net  amount  of  credit  extended  under  the  scheme  wan 
equivalent  to  about  12  per  cent  of  GOP.  Accordingly,  the  credit 
objective for  end-December  was  exceeded  by  a  wide  margin. 
2.3  Fiscal policy 
The  fiscal  stance  turned  out  to  be  tighter  than  planned.  Some 
difficulties  arose  in  tax  collection  during  the  last  quarter  of  1991, 
because of blockages  in the payments  system.  The  estimated outcome  for 
1991  was  a  deficit  for  the  general  government  budget  of  about  2  ~ per 
cent of  GDP  on  a  cash basis,  roughly  in line with  the  planned deficit. 
However,  after  the  global  compensation  operation  was  completed  in 
January  1992,  all  outstanding  tax  arrears  from  the  previous  year  were 
cleared.  After  this  adjustment,  the  deficit  amounted  to  only  0.8  per 
cent  of  GOP.  The  unemployment  fund  and  other  extra-budgetary  funds 
recorded substantial surpluses. 
2.4 External trade 
In  1991,  Romanian  exports  suffered  from  the  virtual  collapse  of  trade 
with  the  USSR.  The  main  cause  was  a  sharp  contraction  in  demand  for 
Romanian  products,  through  supply  dioruption,  including  labour 
problems,  ohortages  of  imported  inputs,  and  financing  conotraints  aloo 
affected  a  number  of  exporters.  As  a  reoult,  total exports  dropped  to 
US$  3.8 billion  in  1991,  from  US$  10.1  billion  in  1989  and  5.5  billion 
in  1990.  With  all  trade  in  transferable  roubles  ending  at  the 
beginning  of  1991,  except  for  the  fulfilment  of contracts  from  earlier 
years,  exports  in  convertible  roubles,  which  accounted  for  the 
equivalent  of  US$  2.4  billion  in  1990,  were  severely  reduced.  Exports 
in convertible currencies were  almost  unchanged  from  the previous year, 
despite  a  oubstantial  liberalization  of  exports  (in  1990,  exports  of 
food  had been prohibited in order to supply the domestic market). 
Imports  recorded  a  oevere compresoion  in  1991,  dropping dramatically to 
US$  4.9  billion  from  US$  8.8  billion  and  US$  8.1  billion  in  1990  and 
1989  respectively.  Imports  in transferable roubles  and  under bilateral 
paymento  agreements,  which  accounted  for  the  equivalent  of  US  $  4. 0 
billion  in  1990,  disappeared  with  the  end  of  trade  in  transferable 
roubles.  Importo  in  convertible  currencieo,  which  had  benefited  in 
1990  from  the  reversal  of  the  former  import  compression  policy  and  the 
introduction  of  policieo  focusing  on  improving  the  population's 
otandard  of  living,  fell  slightly  in  1991.  Imports,  particularly  of 
crude  oil  and  natural  gao,  were  hit  hard  by  the  decline  in  economic 
activity,  financing constraints,  and  the general disarray  in trading in 
the region,  especially with the USSR. 
3.  The  strategy  and  the  achievements  of  the  structural  reform 
programme 
The  Romanian  authorities  designed  a  reform  strategy  to  tranoform  the 
economy  rapidly  into  a  market-based  system.  To  this  end,  the 
government  developed  and  implemented  a  legal  and  institutional 
framework  to  establish  the  central  role  of  private  ownership  and - 41  -
decision-making.  In  this  new  environment,  the  role  of  the  government 
is  expected  to  be  reduced  substantially,  in  contrast  to  the  virtually 
absolute control it had  exercised over the  economy  before  1990. 
By  the  end  of  1991  the  reform  programme  had  achieved  significant 
progress.  Most  prices  had  been  liberalized,  with  controls  continuing 
to  apply  only  to  a  small  list of  products.  Quantitative  restrictions 
on  importa  had  been  removed,  and  tariffs  uoed  to  protect  domestic 
induotries  were  reduced  to  low  levels.  Wage  determination  had  been 
freed,  with  the  inotitution  of  collective  bargaining,  although,  for 
stabilization purposes,  the  government  reaerved  the  option  to  reotrict 
overall  wage  increaaeo.  The  financial  system  had  been  deregulated  and 
banks  were  free  to operate within the  normal  supervisory  and  regulatory 
limits.  Citizeno  had  been  given  the  right  to  eotablish  businesses,  to 
compete  freely  in  the  market,  and  to  acquire,  retain  and  dispose  of 
property.  Finally,  the  Government  wao  proceeding  to  transfer  state 
assets to the population. 
The  reformo  have  also  met  with  some  oetbacko.  Firot,  the  exchange 
system  .oince'  the  rateo  were  unified  in  November  1991  has  not  been 
functioning  as  envioaged.  The  lack  of  foreign  exchange  reserveo  hao 
created expectations  of  sharp depreciation  of  the  interbank rate,  with 
the  attendant  adverse  impacto  on  the  price  level,  wages,  and  capital 
flows.  To  protect  the  economy  from  extreme  volatility,  the  government 
supported  the  exchange  rate  through  administrative  meaoures  in  early 
1992,  before  it  recognized  that  thio  exchange  rate  policy  wao  not 
sustainable.  Second,  while  the  government  deregulated  all  interest 
rates  ao  part  of  the  financial  system  reform  in  April  1991,  interest 
rates  subsequently  showed  little movement  and  remained  highly  negative 
in  real  terms,  largely becauoe  the Savings  Bank  exploited  its monopoly 
position  as  a  deposit-taking  institution.  Third,  enterprise 
restructuring  has  not  been  as  rapid  as  hoped,  and  lax  financial 
discipline  on  enterprises  in  1991  led  to  the  accumulation  of  large 
inter-enterprise arrears. 
3.1 Price  liberalization 
At  the end'of'1990,  the government  began  a  gradual  price liberalization 
programme.  In  three  steps  taken  in  November  1990,  April  1991  and  July 
1991,  the  Government  liberalized most  prices.  By  the  third quarter of 
1991  the  share of  free prices  in the total value  of  sales  had  risen to 
83  per  cent  for  consumer  goods,  88  per  cent  for  capital  and 
intermediate  goods,  and  70  per  cent  for  raw  and  basic  materialo.  The 
price  liberalization  allowed  previously  repressed  prices  to  increase 
sharply  and  removed  most  of  the  monetary  overhang.  However,  the 
government  continued  to  subsidize  staple  foods  and  electricity 
throughout  1991. 
In  November  1991  the price regulations were  further modified  following 
the  exchange  rate  unification.  The  prices  of  energy  products  (except 
some  energy  items  for  household  use)  were  raised  immediately,  so  as  to 
pass  through  the  price  effect  of  unification.  However,  to  prevent 
monopoly  producers  of  intermediate  products  from  using  their  market 
power to raioe prices excessively,  the government  established rules  for 
the  setting  of  prices,  allowable  commissions  and  mark-upo,  and  price 
ceilings  for  35  baoic  raw materials. - 42  -
3.2  Exchanqe  rate unification 
The  exchange  market  wan  unified  in  November  1991,  and  the  formerly 
pegged  official  rnte  (of  lei  60  per  US$)  was  abolished.  This  action 
left  the  exchange  rate  to  be  determined  by  market  forces  in  the 
interbank  foreign  exchange  market,  which  had  been  established  in 
February  1991.  The  foreign  exchange  bureaux  that  had  been  authorized 
since  August  1991  for  phynical  persona'  operationo  could  alno,  as  of 
end-1991,  participate  in  the  foreign  exchange  interbank  market  through 
their  correnpondent  bankn.  The  new  nyntem  also  required  100  per  cent 
nurrender  of  foreign-exchange  receiptn  to  the  banking  nystem.  The 
unified  rate  wan  initially lei  180  per  US$,  and  it fluctuated  between 
180-200  per  US  dollar through the  end  of  1991. 
Partly  an  a  consequence  of  delays  in  external  financing,  a  severe 
foreign-exchange  shortage  developed  in the  firnt months  of  1992.  In  an 
effort  to  limit  price  risen  in  the  light  of  the  forthcoming  wage 
negotiations,  the  Central  Bank  maintained  the  exchange  rate  at  an 
overvalued  level,  forcing  banks  to  ration  foreign  exchange.  In  the 
circumntancen of  an  overvalued exchange  rate and  negative real  interent 
raten,  many  exportern  refrained  from  nurrendering  export  proceeds, 
while  importerc  experienced  delayn  in  obtaining  foreign  exchange  from 
the banking  cystem.  Meanwhile,  the central bank abolished access  by  the 
foreign  exchange  bureaux  to the  interbank market,  and  placed  limits  on 
purchases  of  foreign  exchange  by  individuals.  This  action  led  to  the 
emergence  of  a  wide  npread  between  the  bureau  and  interbank rates. 
3.3 Liberalization of the  exchange  syctem  and  foreign trade 
Imports  and  exporto  of  goodo  were  zubstantially  1 iberalized  from  1 
January  1991,  since when  they  have  been subject to automatic  licenoing, 
with  the  exception  of  a  nhort  list  of  prohibited  itemn,  controlled 
items  and  thane  nubject to temporary  quotas  (mostly to restrain exporto 
of  goods  still oubject  to  domestic  price controlo).  At  the  same  time  a 
number  of  changes  were  introduced  to  the  tariff  code,  with  the  aim  of 
reducing  diotortions.  Generalized  exemptions  for  production  inputs 
used  by  the  public  oector  were  revoked.  The  highoot  tariffs  were  cut 
nignificantly.  A  new  tariff code,  with  lower  and  less  dispersed  rates, 
was  published  in  November  1991  and  went  into effect  in early  1992.  The 
average tariff is about  12  per cent. 
All  restrictions  on  invisible  payments  and  transfers,  including 
limitations  on  travel  allowances  and  on  the  repatriation  of  profit, 
dividends  and  income,  have  been  eliminated.  A  new  foreign  direct 
investment  law  became effective in May  1991.  In principle,  there are  no 
limitn  on  foreign  equity  participation  in  a  commercial  company  set  up 
in  Romania.  Foreign  inventments  can  be  made  in  all  sectors  of  the 
economy  (except if they  infringe on  regulations designed to protect the 
environment,  or  affect  Romania's  national  security  and  defence 
interesto),  and  inventors  are allowed  to repatriate all profito  in hard 
currency  after  the  payment  of  taxeo.  Ao  of  mid-1992,  applicationo  for 
foreign  investment  registered  with  the  Romanian  Development  Agency 
amounted  to an  equivalent of  US$  387  million. 
3.4  Privatization 
The  government  has  designed  a  far-reaching  programme  of  privatization. 
Thin  programme  involven  tranoferring  to  the  private  sector  through 
sales  or  leaoco,  ntate-owned  enterprioeo,  equipment  and  houoing,  ao - 43  -
well  as  land  held  by  agricultural  cooperatives.  Some  6,000  state 
enterprises  have  been  converted  into  commercial  enterprises  since 
September  1990.  The  remaining  state enterprises  (about  320),  operating 
in  sectors  considered  strategic  and  called  "regies  autonomes",  will  be 
converted  into  commercial  enterprises  later,  except  for  natural 
monopolies,  such as utilities. 
In  July  1991  Parliament  adopted  a  wide-ranging  privatization  law  which 
was  to  be  implemented  by  the  recently  created  National  Privatization 
Agency.  The  main  pillar  of  the  pri":atization  process  is  the 
establishment  of  a  "voucher"  scheme,  whereby  all  adult  Romanian 
citizens  arc  to  be  given,  free  of  charge,  30%  of  indirect  interest  in 
state-owned  commercial  companies.  This  30%  will  be  transferred  to  five 
Private  Ownership  Funds,  managed  by  professionals,  while  the  remaining 
70%  will  be  transferred  to  a  State  Ownership  Fund.  The  latter  will 
gradually  divest  its  holdings  in  the  future  until  all  commercial 
companies  have  been  completely privatized.  In  the  meantime,  commercial 
companies  will  be  prepared  for  privatization  by  increasing  their 
efficiency through modernization  and  restructuring. 
In  a  separate  scheme,  30  companies  from  different  sectors  of  the 
economy  are  to  be  rapidly  privatized  as  part  of  a  pilot  privatization 
project  which  will  provide  a  blueprint  for  other  companieo  in  their 
oector. 
Privatization of  omall  plato  of  farmland  io  well  under  way:  nearly all 
co-operatives  have  been  transferred  to  private  hands  while  state-owned 
land  io  to  be  transformed  into  joint-stock  companie!l  and  the  ohares 
distributed  to  farmero.  About  40  per  cent  of  agricultural  land  is 
currently  in  private  ownerohip.  Former  landowners  arc  expected  to 
receive priority in acquiring  otatc-owned  farmland. 
Finally,  by mid-1991  about  50%  of the  housing  stock and,  by early 1992, 
a  third of retail trade,  had  been privatized. 
3.5 Financial  system reform 
Fundamental  changes  in the financial  system  and  institutions started in 
1990,  when  the  establishment  of  private  banks  was  allowed  and  banks 
were  formally  given  the  freedom  to  negotiate  with  economic  units.  In 
December  1990,  a  two-tier  banking  system  wa!l  created  by  !leparating  the 
commercial  and  central  banking  operations  of  the  National  Dank  of 
Romania.  At  end-1991,  the  banking  sector  consisted  of  nine 
institutions,  with  the  Saving  and  Loan  Bank  enjoying  a  dominant 
position for deposit-taking. 
Depooit  and  lending rates were  deregulated  in April  1991  as part of the 
financial  reform.  In spite of these reforms,  deposit  rates subsequently 
showed  little movement.  By  the end of  1991  interest  rates  on  demand  and 
time deposito  were  in the  range of  8-14  per  cent. 
Concern  that  large  spreads  might  develop  between  lending  and  deposit 
rates  because  of  limited  competition,  led  the  Central  Bank  to  impose 
limits  on  those  spreads,  which  were  removed  in  late  1991.  In  order  to 
increase the cost of  fundo  for banks,  the Central  Bank  raised its basic 
refinancing  rate  in several  steps,  to  28  per  cent  per  annum  in January 
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4.  Review of performance criteria attached to the EC  loan 
The  Memorandum  of  Underr;tanding  r;igned  by  the  EC  Commisr;ion  and  the 
Romanian  authoritier;  after  conr;ultation  of  the  Monetary  Committee  set 
out  the  quantified  performance  criteria  and  the  structural  adjustment 
criteria  attached  to  the  Community  medium-term  loan.  The  quantified 
performance  criteria  were  identical  to  thor;e  in  the  stand-by 
arrangement  with  the  IMF  and  included  quarterly  limitr;  on  overall 
credit  and  on  credit  to  the  government,  quarterly  minima  for 
international  rer;erves,  and  limito  on  the  contracting  of  new  medium-
and  long-term  external  debt  by  the  public  oector.  The  structural 
adjuotment  criteria were  der;igned  to evaluate  progress  with  rer;pect  to 
the  implementation  of  otructural  policieo,  with  particular  emphasis  on 
the  liberalization  of  prices,  the  reduction  of  trade  and  exchange 
rcstrictionr;,  the  er;tabliohment  of  a  legal  framework  for  private 
property  rights  and  the  privatization  of  enterpriser;.  The  oucceooful 
review  of  progrer;r;  in economic  stabilization  and  reform,  including the 
obr;ervance  of  performance  criteria,  wan  a  condition  for  the  relear;e  of 
the  second  tranche of  the  loan. 
The  review  which  took  place  in  January  1992  concluded  that  the 
quantitative  performance  criteria  were  either  met  (based  on  end-
September  data)  or  waived  by  the  IMF1),  and  that  the  structural 
performance  criteria  were  also  broadly  met.  Price  liberalization  had 
been  broadly  completed,  with  a  limited list of esoential products still 
subject  to  price  control.  With  regard  to  the  foreign  trade  regime, 
there  were  no  quantitative  restrictions  on  exports  and  the  number  of 
products  subject to export quotas  had  been  oignificantly reduced.  With 
regard  to  investment,  free  repatriation of profits  and  of  the  proceeds 
of  liquidation  of  inveotment  made  by  non-reoidents  was  legally 
permitted  and  inveotment  protection  agreemento  had  been  oigned  with 
nine  member  countrieo  of  the  Community.  The  exchange  rate  had  been 
unified  in  November  1991.  Appropriate  legiolative provioiono  had  been 
adopted  concerning  privatization,  land  reform,  foreign  investment  and 
commercial  law.  Subotantial  progreoo  in the  privatization of  land  and 
houoing  had  been  achieved,  and  a  timetable  for  the privatization of the 
bulk of public enterprises had  been establiohed. 
With  all  criteria  attached  to  the  Community  loan  broadly  met,  the 
second  tranche of the medium-term  loan was  disbursed  in April  1992. 
5.  Developmento  in 1992 
Drawing  on  the  experience  of  1991,  the  Romanian  authorities  have 
designed  a  programme  for  1992  which  aims  to  re-establioh  macroeconomic 
stability  while  advancing  the  reform  procer;s.  With  regard  to 
otabilization  policy  objectiveo,  the  authoritieo  intend  to  olow  the 
decline  in  real  economic  activity  (to  5  per  cent),  to  curb  inflation 
oharply  (to  1. 5  per  cent  per  month  by  year  end) ;  and  to  increaoe 
international  reserves  (to  the  equivalent  of  1. 7  monthr; •  imports  by 
year  end).  To  achieve  theoe  objectiver;,  the  authorities  will  puroue 
strict  f ir;cal  and  monetary  policies,  a  tight  incomes  policy  and  a 
1)  The  Executive  Board  of  the  IMF  had  to  waive  the  non-oboervance  of 
the  performance  criteria  on  net  international  reoerveo  to  allow 
four  purchaoeo  under  the  stand-by  arrangement  in  April,  August  and 
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flexible  exchange  rate.  Structural 
price  liberalization,  privatization, 
restructuring state enterprises. 
reform  measures  include  further 
and  financial  discipline  through 
The  recent  measures  undertaken  in  all  key  areas  show  the  strong 
commitment  of  the  government  to the stabilization programme:  the phased 
elimination  of  consumer  subsidieo  began  with  an  initial  25  per  cent 
reduction  on  1  May;  the  refinancing  rate  of  the  National  Bank  of 
Romania  was  increased to  80  per  cent  on  25  May  in  an  effort  to  ensure 
that  interest  rates  are  positive  in  real  terms;  and  the  exchange 
liberalization started on  2  June,  following  the  elimination of  the  100 
per  cent  surrender  requirement  a  month  earlier.  The  budget  surplus 
during  the  first  five  months  of  the  year  and  the  moderate  increase  in 
money  supply  ( 4  per  cent  in  January-April),  further  point  to  the 
implementation of  a  tight fiscal  and  monetary policy. 
In  support  of  their  economic  programme,  the  Romanian  authorities  have 
requested  further  Community  and  G-24  assistance,  which  would  complement 
the  resources  available  under  the  arrangement  with  the  IMF  that  was 
approved  in  late  May  1992.  The  amount  of  complementary  assistance 
requested  for  1992  was  limited  to  US$  180  million,  largely  owing  to 
last  year's  shortfall  in  pledges  and  delays  in  the  disbursement  of 
commitments. 
The  Commisoion,  as  coordinator  of  the  G-24  financial  assistance,  hao 
supported  the  Romanian  requeot  and  initiated  discussions  with  non-
Community  G-24  countries  with  a  view  to  ensuring  the  mobilization  of 
the  overall  amount.  There  has  been  a  general  recognition  of  the 
eligibility of Romania  for  complementary  G-24  financial  assistance,  and 
most  countries  revealed  a  positive  attitude  towards  participation  in 
the  support  scheme.  The  Commission  has  proposed  for  Council  decision 
that  the  Community  would  participate  in  the  financial  support  package 
from  G-24  to Romania  for  approximately half of the  amount  requested. 